A brief history of US aggression in Venezuela

By Dr. Rodrigo Acuña

Deepcut News

25 Juanuary 2026

Headlines of the kidnapping of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro described a world in “shock” over the US attack. But given the history of US-Latin American relations, people, in particular Venezuelans, should hardly be shocked at all.

US aggression in Venezuela has been replayed time and again in a relationship entangled in a messy web of imperial domination, endless capitalist demands for resources, and the racial faultlines left by centuries of colonialism and slavery in the Americas. Understanding this history, from the Venezuelan perspective, is crucial to understanding what is happening today.

History repeating

The US strikes on Venezuela on January 3 were not the first time the US has applied force to subdue the South American country in a quest for its resources. In the early 20th century, it was tar in Venezuela’s Bermúdez Lake that was the prize for wealthy US elites. When then-Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro refused an American claim to Venezuela’s tar, the US funded a war against Castro by financing local Venezuelan banker Manuel Antonio Matos to launch an insurrection against Castro.

Coined, ironically, the ‘Liberating Revolution’ from 1901 to 1903, the governments of Britain, Germany and Italy sent warships to blockade Venezuela’s ports in La Guaira, Puerto Cabello and Maracaibo. With his enemies claiming outstanding debts, Castro stood firm, drawing racist rebukes from then-US President Theodore Roosevelt as an “unspeakable villainous little monkey”.

The foreign powers disbanded Venezuela’s small navy and bombed the country’s coast. Castro, the ever so stubborn president, still refused to play ball. The US navy then moved into the Caribbean Sea and a US envoy reminded Castro he owed money, “and sooner or later you will have to pay”.

The crisis left 15,000 Venezuelans dead, culminating in a US-backed coup in 1908. Castro’s right-hand man, General Juan Vicente Gómez, was installed as president, and, predictably, allowed foreign companies to drill Venezuela’s vast oil reserves.

Independence and Latin American unification

On the surface, to those outside of Latin America, it might seem paradoxical that President Hugo Chávez’s declared ‘Bolivarian’ revolution in 1999 would draw inspiration from the architect of South American independence: Simón Bolívar (1783–1830). Born of Spanish ancestry in the Americas (what in the region is known as a criollo), Bolívar came from the wealthy colonial elite in Caracas.

After Venezuela first declared its independence in 1811, and then suffered military defeats against the Spanish that saw Bolívar flee into exile, the only government willing to help Bolívar was that of Haiti led by President Alexandre Pétion. Having established the first sovereign state in 1804 after a successful slave rebellion, the example of Haiti terrified elites in both the Western Hemisphere and Europe. While Bolívar promised to free African slaves in the territories he liberated (a promise he fulfilled), the aid he received from Haiti was crucial as it allowed him to launch the expedition that restarted the independence war.

Eventually, having successfully overthrown the Spanish, Latin American elites never repaid Haiti, often downplaying its role in achieving independence due to racial and political prejudice.

Understanding that the new republics – Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia – were always going to be too weak to engage with the rest of the world, Bolívar at the Congress of Panama in 1826 called for a league of American republics to establish a mutual defence pact, and a supranational parliamentary assembly.

In the background to these political developments, three years earlier in 1823, US President James Monroe established the Monroe Doctrine which, according to Washington, prohibited further European colonisation of the Americas. But in practice, it sought to assert US hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, denying Latin America an equal platform. In 1829, writing to a British diplomat on the rise of the Monroe Doctrine, Bolívar stated: “The United States seems destined by Providence to plague the Americas with misery in the name of liberty.”

Post-colonial racial faultlines

Although Bolívar had issued earlier decrees to abolish slavery, such as in 1812 and 1816, it was not until 1854 that the abhorrent practice was banned. Nevertheless, the descendants of criollos still dominated the future political and economic class of Venezuela, albeit with some important exceptions where blacks and persons of mixed race gained some access to political power. This differed to Argentina and Brazil, where whites enjoyed far greater access to political and economic power.

“After emancipation in 1854”, wrote the historian Winthrop R. Wright in his acclaimed book Café con leche: Race, Class and National Image in Venezuela, “blacks continued to live in the shadow of their slave background.” While lighter-skinned Venezuelans long denied the country had an issue with racism, the author observes:

“In their own minds the Venezuelans substituted economic discrimination for racial discrimination. Rather than attribute their antiblack feelings to racial attitudes or racism, Venezuelans argued that they did not like blacks because they lived in poverty.”

Published in 1990, Wright’s study noted that Venezuela’s professed racial harmony was demonstrated by the fact that no census conducted since the 1854 abolition of slavery recorded the population by race.

Racism, class and imperialism: a continuing story

While some sections of the Venezuelan diaspora have come out to celebrate President Donald Trump’s actions, most notably those of light-skin European heritage (blancos), back in Venezuela, the country’s poor, who are predominantly of mixed African, Indigenous and Spanish backgrounds (morenos/mestizos), have been protesting in large numbers against US aggression.

In mid-December, one poll inside Venezuela noted that 90% of Venezuelans rejected any form of US military intervention. Another survey claimed 83% of Venezuelans would be willing to defend their homeland against a foreign invasion.

Although Venezuela’s oil industry was nationalised in 1976, and the country had a limited parliamentary democracy since 1958 when another US-backed dictator was overthrown due to a popular uprising, the country still had poverty rates bordering on 60% of the population.

Like Castro, Chávez and his Bolivarian revolution was far from perfect. While Chávez’s media presence was mocked, or misrepresented in the western press, his supporters adored the way he could ad lib about Venezuelan history, literature, music and politics while often mocking his domestic and international adversaries. Chávez made average Venezuelans feel proud of their indigenous and African roots.

Being the first president of Venezuela to look like 51% of the population (i.e. moreno/mestizo), when Chávez launched a national census in 2011 the opposition – mostly backed by Venezuelans of European ancestry – complained that it was divisive to ask Venezuelans if they considered themselves to be of African descent.

In 2013, the year Chávez died of cancer, the UN reported that poverty in Venezuela “had been significantly reduced, enrolment in education had been increased and illiteracy had been totally eradicated since 2005.” The report also noted that the Chávez administration made great strides to tackle “racial discrimination.”

A revolution in survival mode

Nicolás Maduro – the anointed successor of Chávez – had a difficult job in being the follow-up act to the beloved Chávez. A former bus drive turned trade union leader in Caracas, Maduro was Venezuela’s foreign affairs minister from 2006 to 2012. Making numerous gaffes at first as he struggled to find his own style of communication, Maduro narrowly beat his rival Henrique Capriles in the 2013 presidential election.

Like Chávez, the opposition could not stomach Maduro. Worse, a few years into his presidency, Venezuela had to face the full impact of crushing US sanctions that have left 100,000 people dead and a massive brain drain. In 2015, Barack Obama signed an executive order declaring Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States”.

Maduro also faced numerous assassination attempts, a failed 2020 US-led mercenary invasion, several violent episodes, the seizure of Venezuela’s Citgo Petroleum Corporation by the US government (which denied the Venezuelan state billions in revenue and was sold to a vulture fund), the freezing of US$4.8bn of Venezuela’s gold by the Bank of England, and finally (amongst a very long list), his illegal kidnapping to the US on trumped up charges of drug trafficking.

During his tenure, Maduro’s government further entrenched itself in power. According to its critics on the ultra-left, the government also showed less tolerance towards legitimate criticism. With some poor economic decisions made at the start of his presidency, Maduro claimed a presidential victory in 2024 without releasing a full tally breakdown of the results.

Despite these shortcomings, in 2024, Maduro declared his government had built 5m apartments for underprivileged Venezuelans. Last December, according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Venezuelan economy in 2025 grew by 6.5% – the highest in the region.

In a visit to Caracas in late 2024 (that year the economy grew 8.5%), all of the grocery stores I visited were well stocked with one notable difference: most products were made in Venezuela. Maduro’s administration was shifting Venezuela toward self-sufficiency in the area of food security and, through Chinese, Russian, Turkish and Iranian investments, was beginning to circumvent US sanctions.

In November 2025, the US published its national security strategy, reviving the Monroe Doctrine to “restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere”.

Back in Venezuela, the opposition have yet to stage one demonstration in favour of the US attack. In a recent survey inside Venezuela, “94% of respondents expressed their disapproval of the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores.” But history acts as a guide to how present stories might unfold.

On 4 December 1924, as Vicente Gómez ruled in the interest of Washington and local elites, Cipriano Castro died in exile in the US colony of Puerto Rico. It is hard to see Maduro evading a similar fate.

Posted on January 26, 2026 .

Caracas Residents Describe Terror of US Invasion as They Worry for What’s Next

By Rodrigo Acuña ,

Truthout

9 January 2026

“Several helicopters were dropping bombs, and the windows shattered from the shockwaves,” Caracas resident Paola Rosal told Truthout, describing her experience of the U.S. attack on Venezuela on January 3.

Rosal, a mother of three who lives in Ciudad Tiuna, a massive government-built housing project located in the Fuerte Tiuna military complex in Caracas, said she was alone getting ready to take a shower when “the power went out, and the first bomb fell near my building.” Feeling a sense of terror and panic, Rosal describes how she fled and, for a while, was alone in a carpark. Her mother, who was in her own apartment with her daughters, witnessed a bomb drop in front of her apartment which shattered all of the windows.

“When we went outside to take cover, the next bomb fell,” Rosal told Truthout. “People didn’t know where to go for shelter. It was so awful that my daughter doesn’t want to go back, and like her, many other people feel the same way.” Rosal, a married 40-year-old owner of a bodega, has long voted for the leaders of the Bolivarian revolution: first President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), and then President Nicolás Maduro, who won his first election by a narrow margin in early 2013.

Rosal said she has concrete criticisms of Maduro’s government: For example, she is concerned that the government’s decision to distribute weapons to citizens in preparation for a full-scale U.S. invasion could result in pro-government civilian armed groups (colectivos) gaining more power, and that worries her.

But Rosal was vehement in her outrage and fury in response to the U.S. attack.

“It was a massacre against defenseless people,” Rosal told Truthout, expressing that she is still frightened, angry and uncertain about the future and adding that the U.S. military attack “damaged the infrastructure, the buildings where we live, and killed civilians,” including “the elderly.” Full data has yet to come out on the ages of all the people killed in the strike, but The New York Times confirms that 80-year-old Rosa González was among the dead.

“The way the helicopters attacked indiscriminately is unacceptable,” Rosal added, calling Trump a “violator of all rights,” and decrying how Trump “enters our country as if nothing is wrong, and no one says a word to him.”

The Trump Administration’s Attack on Caracas

At around 2 am on January 3, the bombs ordered by U.S. President Donald Trump commenced falling on Venezuela. The bombs hit the country’s largest military complex, Fuerte Tiuna, whose perimeter contains the civilian Ciudad Tiuna housing project, which is far larger than the military facilities and which is home to tens of thousands of people. The capital’s electricity was also cut off for several hours in sectors of the south, center, and west of Caracas.

Near the capital, the Generalissimo Francisco de Miranda Air Base (La Carlota) was hit, as was the Port of La Guaira — the primary maritime gateway for the Caracas. According to the Venezuelan News Agency, in La Guaira, warehouses of the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security, which holds supplies for dialysis and nephrology programs, were also bombed. Outside of the capital, the Barquisimeto F-16 Base was reportedly hit, as was the Charallave Private Airport and the Higuerote Military Helicopter Base in the state of Miranda.

On January 7, DW News (the international news branch of Germany’s public media outlet) said 24 members of Venezuela’s Bolivarian National Armed Forces were killed, as were 32 members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba and the Ministry of the Interior who were serving an international security mission in a sister Latin American nation. (Due to several agreements between Caracas and Havana, since 1999 thousands of Cuban doctors, nurses, teachers, and sports trainers have been working in Venezuela. By 2009, the number stood at 42,000 Cubans, several of whom have been on military missions.)

Officially, on January 8, the Venezuelan government said 100 people were killed with a similar number injured. On January 3, The New York Times reported that, on the U.S. side, “about half a dozen soldiers were injured” in the operation.

Roughly two-and-a-half hours after the bombing commenced, Trump publicly declared that the United States had “successfully carried out a large-scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolás Maduro, who has been, along with his wife, captured and flown out of the country.” The first image to be released of 63-year-old Maduro showed him in a Nike tracksuit, handcuffed and wearing blackout goggles, with his ears covered. On January 5 it was noted that Maduro’s 69-year-old-wife, Cilia Flores, in a New York court, had a bandage on her head, bruises on her face, and was suffering “significant injuries,” according to her lawyer.

Venezuela Residents and Political Analysts Express Fears for the Future

Jessica Falcon, a Caracas state employee in her late thirties, is deeply worried about the future of Venezuela and the actions of the Trump administration. Asked by Truthout what she thought about the act of war by the United States toward her homeland, Falcon said:

Once again, the U.S. is doing whatever it pleases with the complicit gaze of the rest of the world and multilateral organizations. Venezuela is experiencing a period of great tension, and this violation of our sovereignty seems outrageous. Archaic colonialism in the 21st century — a true step backward.

Corporate media outlets in the United States, Britain, and Australia have focused on the military details of Washington’s illegal actions in Venezuela, using words like “capture” or “arrest” rather than “kidnapping” to describe what the U.S. did to Maduro and Flores.

In contrast, within Venezuela state media have focused on interviewing injured soldiers and civilians. Venezuelan media have also covered Delcy Rodríguez, formally the vice president, being sworn in as the acting president of Venezuela, saying, “I come with pain for the suffering that has been caused to the Venezuelan people after an illegitimate military aggression against our homeland.”

On the streets and online, two key questions are repeatedly asked: How was the U.S. military able to completely disable Venezuela’s air defense systems? And were there people inside Maduro’s inner security circle that betrayed him?

Speaking to Truthout, Clinton Fernandes, a professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia who assess the threats, risks and opportunities that military forces face in the future, said: “Over the past 10 years, there has been a revolution in sensing and precision technologies, eroding the survivability of air defenses and the targets they seek to protect.” Fernandes claims that “new sensors in all domains, including air, space, and cyberspace, have increased enemy transparency.” This development, he said, shaped the course of events last year when Iran’s nuclear facilities were bombed in June 2025, and also shaped the outcome of the U.S. attack on Venezuela.

Fernandes added:

The U.S. has been at the cutting edge of technological advances in stealth, sensing, and precision. Stealth allows it to approach targets undetected. It has guidance systems with advanced inertial sensors relying on stellar updates, sensors, data processing, communication, artificial intelligence, and a host of other products of the computer revolution. Its advantages allow it to create openings for disarming strikes against enemy positions and forces.

Caracas-based Ricardo Vaz, who is a writer and editor at Venezuelanalysis.com, told Truthout that the outcome of the U.S. strike is forcing analysts to reassess previous “expectations concerning Venezuela’s military capabilities and readiness.” Vaz added:

There was an assortment of Russian-supplied short-, medium- and long-range surface-to-air weapons which failed to offer much deterrence to the invading U.S. forces. It is possible that U.S. air power, including bombers and electronic warfare planes, managed to completely neutralize air defences.

Meanwhile, speaking recently to journalist Jeremy Scahill, Venezuela’s ex-Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for North America Carlos Ron said that while he did not want to speculate that someone inside Maduro’s security detail betrayed him, “you can’t rule out that something to that effect happened.”

What Comes Next for Venezuela?

Back in Washington, during his first press conference after Maduro and Flores’s kidnapping, a gloating Trump declared: “We are going to run the country,” in reference to Venezuela. He added: “We’ll have the greatest oil companies in the world going in, invest billions and billions of dollars. … And the biggest beneficiary are going to be the people of Venezuela.” When asked about installing opposition leader María Corina Machado, who claimed the 2024 presidential election was stolen from Edmundo González, who ran on her behalf, Trump replied: “She doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country.” On January 9, Trump claimed he would meet with Machado in the next week.

Asked by Truthout to comment on the ramification of Washington’s actions in Venezuela, Luis F. Angosto-Ferrández — a scholar at Sydney University and the author of the book Venezuela Reframed — predicted that the Trump administration “will use the kidnapping of President Maduro (and the forthcoming theatralisation of his trial) as another mechanism of destabilisation and pressure on the Venezuelan government.” Still, Angosto-Ferrández argued, “it is evident that they continue to fail in their attempts at making the government collapse.”

While a clearer picture will develop as future events unfold under the pressure of the current U.S. economic blockade on Venezuela, Angosto-Ferrández says:

What is clear is that the U.S. government’s expectations of an immediate collapse of Venezuelan governance and institutionality are not going to happen even with the kidnapping of Maduro. Other than that, the U.S. may decide to continue with its illegal attacks, and perhaps even invade the country with the goal of controlling it in part — basically, enclaves that give access to oil and perhaps minerals.

Constantly paraded in front of the global media in a humiliating manner as he is being transported (it is illegal to publicly degrade prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention), Maduro has shown himself to be cordial with his captors while making a two-handed symbol — one hand forming a “V,” the other pointing toward it — meaning “Nosotros venceremos,” or “Together we will win”.

In front of a judge in New York on January 5, President Maduro in Spanish declared: “I am innocent. I am not guilty. I am a decent man.” He described himself a “prisoner of war” and said he was illegally captured.

The four charges that the U.S. has made against Maduro are narcoterrorism conspiracy, cocaine importation conspiracy, possession of machine guns and destructive devices, and conspiracy to possess machineguns and destructive devices.

Maduro has hired Barry Pollack — the distinguished U.S. trial lawyer who spent years representing Australian WikiLeaks editor Julian Assange — to join his legal team.

Meanwhile, with Maduro’s next court appearance set for March 17, the U.S. armada continues to sit off the coast of Venezuela while crushing economic sanctions are imposed on the Latin American country.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Experts Say Even Average Venezuelans Critical of Maduro Won’t Back Regime Change

By Rodrigo Acuña

Truthout

16 December 2025

President Donald Trump has escalated threats against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in recent weeks, and reports now say the Trump administration is preparing for the days after a potential Maduro overthrow.

What might happen in such a scenario? In November, Michael Crowley at The New York Times pursued this question by reminding readers that, during Trump’s first term, U.S. officials were asked to run a war game to examine what Venezuela in a post-Maduro era would look like. According to Douglas Farah, a national security consultant who specializes in Latin America, the war game showed that the overthrow of Maduro would yield “chaos for a sustained period of time with no possibility of ending it.” Crowley, at his end, adds that the results of the exercise note that “chaos and violence were likely to erupt within Venezuela, as military units, rival political factions and even jungle-based guerrilla groups jockeyed for control of the oil-rich country.”

Currently, no such chaos has erupted in Venezuela despite at least 95 people having been killed by the United States military in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific as of December 16. Although the White House has repeatedly alleged that those targeted have been involved in smuggling narcotics into the U.S. mainland, the Trump administration has yet to produce any evidence to support its claims.

At the end of November, Trump took to social media, stating: “To all Airlines, Pilots, Drug Dealers, and Human Traffickers, please consider THE AIRSPACE ABOVE AND SURROUNDING VENEZUELA TO BE CLOSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.” And on December 10, Trump told journalists that the U.S. had recently “seized a tanker on the coast of Venezuela, a large tanker, very large, the largest one ever seized actually.” The Venezuelan government condemned the seizure as “blatant theft and an act of international piracy.”

With the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier group in the Caribbean Sea in November, and media reports indicating that there are now 15,000 U.S. troops in the region and approximately 5,000 personnel at bases in Puerto Rico, there are two likely outcomes: Trump is either bluffing to see if the Venezuelan military will carry out a coup against Maduro, or worse, is actually planning for the U.S. to attack Venezuela militarily. Meanwhile, a recent poll conducted by CBS News concluded that 70 percent of people in the United States are opposed to the Trump administration taking military action against Venezuela.

Inside Venezuela, the people Truthout spoke to for this article said that, while they are certainly following the crisis, most people are continuing with their daily lives. According to Fanny Chacón Sánchez, a 39-year-old mother of two who works for a government bank, “the way [the] international media portray things on social networks looks like a completely different reality.” Chacón notes that although the U.S. Navy’s actions are on people’s minds, this is “just another chapter of the illegal blockade we already know” that “suffocate[s] us” — a reference to the U.S. economic sanctions on Venezuela which commenced in 2005.

Living in a state-built apartment, which she is paying off at affordable rates though the government’s massive housing program known as Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela (Great Mission Housing Venezuela), Chacón used to live in New Horizon, which is part of Catia, one of Venezuela’s largest, poorest and most densely populated areas. A supporter of the Maduro government, Chacón says on the streets of Caracas:

“People are focused on their own stuff: working, making ends meet, and now, even more so, getting Christmas ready for the kids. Making sure there are Christmas bonuses and the Nativity scene. Life continues on its “normal” course, as much as this harsh reality allows. It’s not that we ignore everything else; it’s that we’ve been resisting for years and we’re not going to stop now.”

Anais Márques, a communal leader at the 5 de Marzo Commune in Caracas, a grassroots community organization in El Valle neighborhood that comprises around 2,270 working-class families, shared a similar perspective with Truthout. With life continuing largely as normal, Márques notes the recent November election in which more than 5,300 community circuits (communes) voted to pick which community proposed projects will obtain state funding. According to Márques, the election saw “civic participation” as “several communal councils renewed their spokespersons through secret ballots.”

In Márques’s opinion, “both Chávez and now Maduro have always had the support and backing of an organized, mobilized people,” which “is why they still haven’t defeated us.” Believing that Maduro will resolve the crisis, Márques highlights the civic-military union that exists between the government and the armed forces, stating: “We have a people and we have soldiers, and the soldiers have the people.”

Although mainstream reporting in favor of overthrowing Maduro often (and rather conveniently) ignores this fact, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s political movement was originally born in the barracks when he was a soldier in the 1980s. Chávez’s came to power through an election in 1999, then suffered a short-lived U.S.-backed coup d’etat in 2002 headed by the upper echelons of the armed forces. Subsequently Chávez proceeded to purge the army and cement his doctrine of Latin American-style socialism. From 2007, Venezuela’s armed forces adopted the slogan: “Patria, socialismo o muerte! Venceremos!” (“Fatherland, socialism or death! We will prevail!”)

With a different perspective from those of Chacón and Márques, Antonio Gonzalez Plessmann, a human rights activist in Caracas and militant leftist since the 1980s, no longer supports Maduro. Plessmann thinks Venezuelans’ main anxiety remains “economic precariousness” and says household incomes for an average family of four cannot cover the cost of food and basic necessities. As a result, Plessmann told Truthout, many people have “several jobs to make ends meet,” a situation that is not uncommon throughout many Latin American countries.

“Madurismo is a mutation of Chavismo, which separates from the strategic postulates of the Bolivarian Revolution: popular participation, democratic radicalism, and anti-capitalist orientation,” Plessmann says. Former President Chávez, in his view, “was hated by Fedecámaras [the main business association] and loved by the poor” while Maduro is “loved by Fedecámaras” and “despised by the majority of the popular sectors, many of whom were once Chavistas.” While Washington has attempted “regime change” on several occasions against Venezuela’s head of state, Plessmann says, Maduro now finds himself “at one of his weakest moments: He lacks popular support and real backing from much of Latin America.”

According to one survey in September, 65 percent of Venezuelans rated Maduro’s management of the country positively, 28 percent said they had a negative opinion, while 7 percent answered with either don’t know or no answer.

Democracy Now! co-host Juan González asserted in a recent interview with Jyotishman Mudiar, host of the “India & Global Left” podcast, that if the United States attacks Venezuela militarily, the conflict will broaden throughout Latin America. Observing that Maduro has already “put out a call for international volunteers to come to Venezuela to support the Bolivarian Revolution,” González argued that Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Colombians “will be a part of that resistance.” Elaborating on his comments on Colombia, González stated that, up until recently, the country had the “single largest and most extensive revolutionary movement in the history of Latin America,” as was the case with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia that demobilized in 2016 after reaching a peace agreement with the government.

Colombia’s second-largest guerrilla movement, the Army of National Liberation (ELN) has yet to reach an agreement with the administration of Gustavo Petro, who presides over a broad-left coalition. According to a report from the International Crisis Group, whose analysis is often in line with U.S. political establishment, the ELN “has repeatedly stated its commitment to defend the Maduro government, and has promised to turn its fire on any foreign forces that intervene in the region; its expertise includes use of improvised explosives and, more recently, armed drones.”

While there is no hard evidence of complicity between the Maduro administration at the highest levels and the ELN, the current government in Caracas and the guerrillas are, broadly speaking, both influenced by liberation theology, the Cuban Revolution, and the 18th-century independence fighter Simón Bolívar’s calls for regional unification among Latin American countries. According to the Washington Office on Latin America, the ELN in April this year numbered over 6,000 active guerrillas, while a local report in Colombia claims about 20 percent of the rebels operate in the region of Catatumbo, on the northern border with Venezuela.

González also noted that China has become an important factor in Washington’s calculations and aggression toward Venezuela, given that it has become the main purchaser of the country’s oil. “At one point, something like 70 percent of Venezuela’s oil was going to China,” says González, with that figure now down to “about 45 percent” However, it still remains the largest buyer of the South American country’s oil. As with the case of Panama, where the government ended the Central American country’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative after Trump issued a series of threats ranging from increasing trade tariffs to an outright military invasion to take back the Panama Canal, Trump’s advisers cannot be looking at Beijing’s growing economic presence in Latin America kindly.

Miguel Tinker Salas, a professor of Latin American history at Pomona College in Claremont, California, told Truthout that the massive military deployment off the coast of Venezuela, the exuberant negative press campaign against the Maduro administration, and the crushing economic sanctions all look to “expose fissures within the Venezuelan military and the political apparatus of the governing party.” He adds that despite this pressure, “the concerted campaign fissures have not materialized” as the majority of “Venezuelans are firmly opposed to a U.S. intervention.” From Tinker’s perspective, the majority of Venezuelans reject violence as a tactic to obtain political change.

At Washington’s end, Tinker says Trump’s new approach “involves efforts to isolate China, which has gained an important foothold in the past 20 years” while “investing close to a billion dollars to produce oil in Lake Maracaibo,” — a region located in the northwest of Venezuela in the state of Zulia, which accounts for most of the country’s oil production. Tinker told Truthout he thinks U.S. military forces are aiming for an extended stay in the Caribbean as part of a “Western Hemisphere Strategy.”

The problem, he says, is that “U.S.-led efforts at regime change have been disastrous” and any administration imposed through force will face a “crisis of legitimacy, especially if they begin to implement neoliberal economic policies as they have proposed.” He adds that while “important segments of the population may be critical of Maduro,” these Venezuelans “will not stand idly by and allow their rights to be subverted.”

Steve Ellner is a retired professor of economic history and political science from the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela, where he lived for over 40 years. As things currently stand in the crisis, “the most likely scenario is an extended siege,” because “the other options at this point are too risky for Washington,” Ellner told Truthout. Elaborating on this point, he added:

“Venezuela has advanced weapons systems from Russia and training which Washington claims comes from the Wagner mercenaries. It doesn’t matter who does the training; from Caracas’s viewpoint the training is absolutely justifiable, given the intensity and prolonged nature of the threat. From a political viewpoint it’s unlikely that Trump would just pull out, since he would face intense criticism and a loss of MAGA support given everything that has been done up until now.”

Back in Caracas, according to Ellner, “many non-Chavistas and anti-Chavistas are enrolling in the militia.” Asked about an article published in The New York Times in October that claimed that secret negotiations around Venezuela’s resources were taking place in order to avoid a military conflict, Ellner said the chance they succeed should not be dismissed entirely. “Maduro,” claimed Ellner, “is willing to make concessions … which would allow Trump to spin a narrative that the U.S. got what it wants.” Such concessions might include handing over individuals accused of being involved in the drug trade as well as “concessions regarding Venezuela’s oil reserves.”

Márques, like all the Venezuelans Truthout spoke to, is hopeful the crisis will be resolved. “It has taken so much effort to achieve our independence, and we cannot believe that a U.S. military intervention in Venezuela would bring stability,” she said. “Without a doubt,” she added, a U.S. military attack “would bring more chaos, more poverty — especially for the working class.”

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

In Chile’s Presidential Race, Communist Party Candidate Faces the Son of a Nazi

By Rodrigo Acuña

Truthout

12 November 2025

This coming weekend, Chile will witness another presidential election — the ninth since the U.S.-backed dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet stepped down from power in 1990. While several candidates are seeking to woo voters in the first round of balloting this month, the main battle for the presidency will most likely come down to two figures in the second round in December: the Communist Party’s Jeannette Jara Román (age 51), who is running for the incumbent Apruebo Dignidad coalition, and the far right politician José Antonio Kast (age 59) of the Republican Party.

At first glance, in a country where less than 10 percent of the media is publicly owned and the rest (with a strong anti-progressive bias) is in private hands, putting forward Jara as a presidential candidate may appear an odd choice. Outside of the Revolutionary Left Movement, the Communist Party of Chile was the most persecuted political organization under Pinochet’s dictatorship from 1973 to 1990. In 1983, the party created an armed faction known as the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, which in 1986 came within seconds of assassinating Pinochet in one of the most dramatic political attacks in modern Latin American history.

Legally re-registered in 1989, the Communist Party of Chile remained excluded from congressional representation for two decades, largely due to the restrictive dual-member electoral system. It was not until the 2009 elections that the party finally returned to parliament, after having formed a strategic alliance with the center-left Concertación coalition. In 2015, Chile’s dual-member system was replaced by a proportional representation system.

Speaking to Truthout, freelance journalist Andrés Figueroa Cornejo, who works in Santiago, described Jara as a “former university classmate.”

“Since I’ve known her,” said Figueroa Cornejo, “she has been part of the Chilean institutional left — the sector that believes that by promoting gradual, progressive changes, the structures of the Chilean capitalist state can one day be transformed.” He added that during her tenure at the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare from early 2022 until April 2025, under the government of center-left President Gabriel Boric, Jara “displayed very good intentions, but that ministry has always been subordinate to the Ministry of Finance, where the public purse is held.”

Professor Sergio Grez Toso, a distinguished historian at the Universidad de Chile, told Truthout that “Jara is a skilled professional politician who has managed to build a career by climbing to the highest levels of the political-administrative hierarchy of the subsidiary state.” However, he noted that this rise occurred “within the framework of a prevailing neoliberal economy and a society governed by a restricted, tutelary, and low-intensity democracy that has existed in this country since 1990.”

Taking into consideration Jara’s political rise to position herself as the center-left’s leading presidential candidate, her background story is still interesting. It also explains why she is popular among many working-class Chileans who can identify with her humble origins.

Born in the commune of Conchalí, in northern Santiago, Jara grew up in the neighborhood of El Cortijo living in a mediagua (makeshift home) without access to running water. Raised primarily by her grandmother, she joined the Juventudes Comunistas de Chile (Communist Youth of Chile) at the age of 14.

She worked a variety of temporary jobs during her youth, such as a seasonal farm worker and a street vendor. Then, in 1997, as president of the Student Federation of the University of Santiago, she was arrested for her participation in a student protest demanding educational reforms. That same year, Jara helped organize a memorial at Chile’s National Stadium for the 30th anniversary of Che Guevara’s death that was attended by 60,000 people. Graduating with a degree in public administration, she then went on to obtain a law degree from the Universidad Central de Chile.

During her tenure as minister of labor, Jara claims she helped implement legislation reducing the normal workweek from 45 to 40 hours. Some of the other triumphs she points to include the introduction of a law (“Ley Karin”) addressing workplace harassment and violence, the implementation of a significant increase in the minimum wage, and the adoption of pension reforms that led to an increase in contributions from employers.

While pushing for greater gender equality in the workforce, Jara has come under criticism due to a rise in female unemployment during her tenure from 8.7 percent to 9.7 percent. Worse, general unemployment increased from 7.8 percent in March 2022, to 8.8 percent in April 2025 when she stepped down from the ministry.

Grez Toso told Truthout, “Although [Jara] formally maintains membership in the Communist Party, she has recently declared her social-democratic orientation. In reality, she represents the most conservative wing of the party — those leaders who have held high posts in Gabriel Boric’s government or have been the least critical of his performance.”

Before Boric launched his presidential campaign in 2021, his main rival for leadership of the Chilean left was Daniel Jadue, the Communist Party mayor of Recoleta. Although Boric, representing the Social Convergence Party, ultimately defeated Jadue to become the Apruebo Dignidad coalition’s presidential candidate who won the race for the presidency, the inclusion of the Communist Party of Chile in the coalition that brought Boric to power has permanently linked Jara to his administration, which has polled badly throughout most of its term in office.

Boric’s presidency began in 2022 after massive demonstrations against the legacy of Pinochet’s mass privatization devastated the country from 2019 to 2020 — an uprising known as el estallido social (“the social outburst”). Boric, who was once a prominent radical student leader who promised to transform Chilean politics, went on to face widespread criticism in office for failing to garner enough support to replace the 1980 Constitution imposed under military rule. Boric’s government has, at best, introduced only limited constitutional reforms.

In southern Chile, Boric has faced intense criticism for failing to resolve the conflict between Mapuche Indigenous communities and powerful logging and forestry companies. Figueroa Cornejo said Boric’s administration has presided over “a vicious battery of repressive laws passed not only against the Mapuche people in resistance, but also against all dissent toward the dominant order.”

Adding to the pressure, corporate media outlets have increasingly focused on rising crime rates — particularly violent and cartel-related crime — despite Chile’s homicide rate still being one of the lowest in Latin America. Between 2021 and 2022, Chile’s national public prosecution service (Fiscalía de Chile) reported a 46 percent increase in homicides, reaching 6.7 per 100,000 inhabitants. However, subsequent reports for 2023 and 2024 indicate a downward trend, with a 4 percent decrease in homicides year over year. Despite this, Chile recorded 868 kidnappings in 2024 — the highest figure in a decade.

As Chile experienced a 16 percent increase in irregular migration between 2018 and 2023, immigration — along with crime and public safety — has become deeply politicized and central to the national agenda.

Writing for Global Americans, a U.S.-based think tank focused on Latin America, Victoria Flowerree and Juan Diego Solís de Ovando Bitar observed that “the economy is the other defining pillar of this election,” noting that “after more than a decade of weak growth, many Chileans feel the country has lost its momentum” and want “an economy that creates opportunities again.”

The hard right in Chile has been able to capitalize on all of these issues. “Currently,” says Rafael Agacino, an independent economics researcher based in Santiago who spoke to Truthout, of the three Chilean presidential candidates with German heritage, “[Evelyn] Matthei, [Johannes] Kaiser, and Kast — it is Kast who, according to all polls, has the best chance of winning both the first and second rounds to be anointed President of Chile.” He adds:

“But Kast is not a libertarian in the style of [Argentina’s President Javier] Milei or Kaiser, nor a neoliberal in the economic sense like Matthei. He is rather a political conservative and an ideological corporatist, rooted in a clearly authoritarian and anti-popular tendency. His family’s Nazi affiliation is well-known. Yet, because of how he has presented himself in this campaign — as a centrist compared to the ultra-rightist Kaiser — this has not been used against him as it was in his previous candidacy.”

Agacino argues that Kast’s historical ties to Pinochet — and his father’s ties to the Nazi regime — no longer spark outrage because Chile is undergoing a broader shift toward conservative and authoritarian attitudes.

Back in 2021, during that year’s presidential election, two Associated Press journalists uncovered a record in Germany’s Federal Archive showing that an 18-year-old man named Michael Kast joined the Nazi Party in Germany on September 1, 1942. As reported by The Washington Post, this document essentially confirmed that this man was the father of the current Republican candidate, José Antonio Kast. Chilean journalist Javier Rebolledo, in his book Shadow of the Crows, claims that Michael Kast rose to the rank of second lieutenant in the German army. Upon Kast’s capture by U.S. forces in April 1945, another journalist, Manuel Salazar Salvo, claims that Kast “jumped from the second floor of a school, where he was a prisoner, and escaped,” eventually making his way to South America.

In Chile, Kast and his wife Olga María Kreszencia Rist had 10 children, including Miguel Kast Rist — one of the original Chicago Boys and a minister of labor under Pinochet. In 1982, Miguel Kast was appointed president of Chile’s Central Bank but died of cancer a year later.

In 1988, during the plebiscite on whether Chile should continue under military rule or move toward a democracy, a young José Antonio Kast appeared in a broadcast in support of Pinochet’s continued rule. Following his qualification as a lawyer from the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Kast founded a law firm and managed his family’s real estate company during the 1990s, prior to his move into politics.

Reflecting on the dictatorship, José Antonio Kast said in Spanish in 2020 that he was “not a Pinochetista,” but that he valued “what was done during the Military Government” and what his brother “did as a minister” on public spending. In 2017, Kast told the media that if Pinochet were alive, “he would vote for me.”

Commenting on the connection between today’s far right and Chile’s past, Figueroa Cornejo told Truthout:

“The younger generations, who did not suffer under Pinochet’s tyranny, view the dictatorship as something from prehistory. And be warned — it’s not just Kast who is of German origin and embraces a supremacist, authoritarian, and racist Pan-Germanism. Evelyn Matthei is the daughter of a member of the dictatorship’s military junta, and Johannes Kaiser, also of German origin, is a full-fledged fascist.”

Figueroa Cornejo predicts that a Kast government will see major crackdowns on student protests and Indigenous demonstrations, mass evictions of the unhoused people who occupy land to survive, and renewed attacks on Chile’s already weakened unions. He warns that further privatizations could follow — a serious problem if one considers that mining in general makes up 55 percent of Chilean exports, and copper mining makes up around 45 percent. In 2024, Codelco, the world largest state-owned copper company, only accounted for 25 percent of Chile’s copper output.

Reflecting on the post-dictatorship period, Grez Toso criticized the Concertación coalition governments led by the Christian Democratic Party, the Party for Democracy, and the Socialist Party between 1990 and 2010. These governments, he said, “granted democratic credentials to the [right-wing] parties and leaders who were the civilian backbone of the dictatorship — and who are now rubbing their hands together, preparing to return to power for a third time with proposals more radical than those of [former President] Sebastián Piñera’s two terms.”

According to Grez Toso, after the Agreement for Social Peace and a New Constitution of November 15, 2019 — which sought to contain the estallido social protests — a broader conservative backlash began to take shape, one that the Boric government’s centrist policies have since helped entrench. These policies, he argues, have contributed to “the demobilization of popular social movements and to disillusionment, apathy, and fatigue among large segments of left-leaning or progressive citizens.”

Agacino was similarly critical of Boric’s administration and unimpressed with Jara’s record as labor minister. Based on current polling, Figueroa Cornejo believes that Kast is the most likely to win Chile’s second round of voting in December if no candidate secures a majority in the first. Grez Toso shares that view, saying that barring an “extraordinary, unpredictable event,” Jara will suffer a “resounding defeat” in the second round.

Chileans will head to the polls for the first round on November 16.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Trump Is Gunning for War in Venezuela, Raising Fears of US-Backed Regime Change

By Rodrigo Acuña

Truthout

21 October 2025

The Trump administration is attacking boats in the Caribbean Sea with such frequency that it may blow up another between the publication of this article and your reading of it. The administration has so far failed to produce any hard evidence behind its allegations that the seven speedboats destroyed by U.S. airstrikes were carrying narcotics. As of October 21, reports indicate that 32 people have been killed in these attacks. On October 3, a speedboat reportedly carrying Colombian citizens was destroyed in one such missile strike, prompting Colombian President Gustavo Petro to post on X that a “war scenario” has emerged in the Caribbean.

This week, Colombia recalled its ambassador to the United States while accusing the Trump administration of “murdering” the fisherman while labelling another strike that took place in mid-September as a “direct threat to national security.” Donald Trump for his part has called Petro an “illegal drug dealer” while saying that the President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro “doesn’t want to fuck around” with the U.S. — a reference to a report in The New York Times that alleged Maduro has tried to cut a resource deal with Washington in order to avoid a military conflict.

The legality of these strikes has been questioned by several experts. Dan Herman, senior director at the Washington-based think tank Center for American Progress, said Trump has “no legal authority to conduct these strikes” and noted that the U.S. government has “presented no evidence for its claims.” Herman believes these attacks are unlikely to have any meaningful impact on the influx of drugs into the United States.

Former army captain and army lawyer Margaret Donovan concurred in a recent MSNBC interview, stating that Trump has “no domestic or international legal authority to conduct these strikes.” Donovan, a visiting lecturer at Yale Law School, added: “When you don’t have domestic or international legal authority to conduct these types of strikes, what you are doing is murdering people.”

Similarly, James Story, who served as U.S. ambassador to Venezuela from 2018 to 2023, said Trump’s strikes place the United States in “contravention with international law and it undermines our ability to work in the hemisphere.”

The current U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean Sea commenced on August 14, with the Trump administration alleging it was due to threats from Latin American drug traffickers. Based on available media reports, there are approximately 10 U.S. Navy ships in the Caribbean Sea, with three directly off the coast of Venezuela. According to Military.com, there are also currently “10,000 U.S. troops now operating in the Caribbean [who] were sent to interdict drug boats.”

U.S. foreign policy toward Venezuela, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, has long aimed at regime change. In April 2002, the administration of President George W. Bush quickly endorsed the leadership of Pedro Carmona, head of the national business federation Fedecámaras, after a faction of the military kidnapped President Hugo Chávez for 47 hours, until he was rescued by loyalist armed forces.

Since then, the United States has implemented increasingly harsh economic sanctions against Venezuela. In 2015, then-President Barack Obama declared Venezuela a threat to U.S. national security, a move that prompted foreign ministers from a coalition of 12 South American nations to call on Washington to revoke the decree. By 2017, U.S. sanctions had tangible effects: a low-income Venezuelan family of five could expect to consume only 6,132 calories per day — 1,226 per person if divided equally. Earlier this year, The Lancet reported that U.S.-led sanctions contribute to an estimated 564,000 deaths across the world each year, with a significant proportion occurring in Venezuela.

After Hugo Chávez’s death from cancer in 2013, President Nicolás Maduro initially struggled to fill the political vacuum. Between 2013 and 2019, Venezuela saw an 80 percent drop in imports, devastating its import-dependent economy. In 2019, the Trump administration continued the U.S. trend of throwing its weight behind opposition leaders, this time backing Juan Guaidó, who challenged Maduro’s 2018 reelection. Trump’s choice to formally recognize Guaidó as interim president signaled a renewed push by the U.S. to overturn the Bolivarian government.

Former Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper, in his autobiography A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times, revealed that for Trump, regime change in Venezuela “seemed to be a bucket list item” and that the U.S. should “get the oil.” In addition to holding the largest proven oil reserves in the world — approximately 303 billion barrels, or roughly 17 percent of global reserves — Venezuela also holds significant gold, iron ore, bauxite, coltan, and diamond deposits.

In a 2022 interview with “60 Minutes,” Esper recounted how during his first term Trump repeatedly asked the Department of Defense about taking more aggressive measures to remove Maduro, including direct military action.

Eventually, Trump settled on deploying a U.S. naval fleet to the Caribbean under the supposed auspices of fighting drug trafficking. In March 2020, the Southern District of New York charged Maduro with narco-terrorism and offered a bounty of up to $15 million for information leading to his arrest or conviction. In July this year, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office  of  Foreign  Assets  Control (OFAC) designated the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) as a terrorist organisation. As of August 7, 2025, the bounty on Maduro stands at $50 million, despite the fact that most international experts — including the authoritative 2025 United Nations World Drug Report — consider Venezuela a minor player in the narcotics trade.

With the Trump administration back in power, the U.S. president appears determined to remove the Venezuelan head of state, potentially through direct military action. María Corina Machado, a right-wing opposition leader who was recently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, could be seen as a figure acceptable to Washington in a transitional government. Having been an avid supporter of the 2002 coup against Chávez, Corina Machado is a strong supporter of the privatization of Venezuela’s state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). In 2018, Machado wrote a letter to the ex-president of Argentina Mauricio Macri and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisting they use their “strength and influence to advance the dismantling of the criminal Venezuelan regime,” which, in her view, were connected to “drug trafficking and terrorism.”

In Caracas, speaking to Truthout, Ricardo Vaz, writer and editor at Venezuelanalysis.com, says life continues as normal, though “there is tension and concern with this U.S. military buildup on Venezuela’s doorstep.” He notes that while there is awareness of U.S. military might, “there is also defiance,” particularly among the government’s core supporters. Vaz warns that while the current U.S. presence in the Caribbean is insufficient for a full-scale regime change, it has “a lot of potential for destruction, be that from cruise missiles or aircraft, aimed at triggering some internal collapse.”

Adding to these tensions, the Trump administration has granted the CIA authorization to conduct covert operations in Venezuela, according to The New York Times.

In September, ministers from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) held a virtual meeting, denouncing the deployment of U.S. military vessels near Venezuela. CELAC, unlike the U.S.-dominated Organization of American States (OAS), provides a forum for regional countries to discuss issues without Washington’s presence, with Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico playing leading roles.

Should the United States carry out direct attacks on Venezuelan territory, Caracas could expect strong diplomatic support from the region despite no longer enjoying the political influence it held under Chávez.

Venezuela’s economy has grown for 17 consecutive quarters since 2021, aided by liberalization measures that have not always been popular with the government’s base. In early September, China Concord Resources Corp installed a self-elevating offshore platform in Lake Maracaibo, marking the first significant infrastructure investment in the area in many years. The Alala jackup rig is expected to increase production from 12,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 60,000 bpd by 2026 in the Lago Cinco and Lagunillas Lago oilfields in the state of Zulia, in western Venezuela. A major U.S. military strike could damage the economy, but China’s significant investments might complicate any potential targeting of infrastructure.

Talking to Truthout, Joel Linares Moreno, a Caracas-based fixer for international media outlets, notes that if the Trump administration deployed full military force, organized resistance might only last a few days given the huge imbalance of power between the United States military and Venezuela’s army, air force, and navy. However, Linares Moreno adds that removing government supporters — known as Chavistas — would likely require a force willing to carry out serious human rights abuses. “They know what awaits them is a Pinochet-style dictatorship, and that’s precisely why they would fight hard, even after the Venezuelan military is neutralized,” he said. He warns that the U.S. could “overplay its hand.”

The coming weeks and months will reveal the Trump administration’s plans for Venezuela and whether Maduro and the Chavistas can remain in power. It will also highlight whether the governments of Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico can gather enough international diplomatic support to halt a U.S.-led war in Latin America, which has not been seen since the U.S. invasion of Panama in late 1989. That military operation, like the current one in the Caribbean Sea, was based on a string of falsehoods.

A correction was made to clarify that the platform in Lake Maracaibo was not the first of its kind but rather the first significant infrastructure investment in the area in many years.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Venezuela: A Contested Election or is the U.S.-Backed Opposition Crying ‘Wolf’ Again?

By Rodrigo Acuña

Z Network

23 August 2024

On 28 July a presidential election took place in Venezuela. Expected to be one of the closest presidential races in years, soon after midnight, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared that, with 80 percent of the vote counted, incumbent leftist president Nicolás Maduro won by 5,150,092 votes (51.20 percent) to the 4,445,978 votes (44.2 percent) obtained by ultra-right candidate Edmundo González. With a voter turnout of 59.97 percent, González stood in for far-right opposition figure María Corina Machado after she was banned by the Supreme Court earlier this year for supporting harsh U.S. economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Immediately after the CNE announcement on 29 July Machado claimed González won with 70 percent of the vote. ‘“Venezuela has a new president-elect and it is Edmundo González. We won and the whole world knows it,” said Machado in a joint statement with González.

With the CNE declaring that it suffered a massive cyber attack during the election, “the electoral body,” noted Venezuelan journalist Andreína Chávez Alava, “did not release the results broken down by [the] voting center on its website which remains out of service.” Chávez Alava added that “CNE authorities have denounced an ongoing cyber attack that has delayed the vote-tallying and publishing operations” while the “magnitude of the issue has not been fully clarified.”

By 1 August U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken declared that the the government of the United States: “congratulat[ed] Edmundo González Urrutia on his successful campaign,” adding that it was now “time for the Venezuelan parties to begin discussions on a respectful, peaceful transition in accordance with Venezuelan electoral law.”

Despite this being the twentieth election since the late president Hugo Chávez won office in 1998 and commenced the Bolivarian revolution, much of the mainstream media has supported the opposition’s narrative. For those familiar with Venezuelan politics though, this is not the first time the opposition have cried foul play and been discredited.

Speaking to ZNet, Alan MacLeod, a journalist who covered the elections from Caracas for MintPress News, said the “international media have largely lionized González as a ‘grandfather-of-the-nation’ character (CNN) who can unite the people. While many mention that he retired from the diplomatic service in 2002, few note the reason for this: he was forced out in shame, after supporting a far-right coup against the government.” 

Asked about Machado, MacLeod said that: “few media outlets mention Machado’s participation in the 2002 coup against Huge Chávez, nor the fact that her career has been consistently bankrolled by the U.S. government. Her organization, Súmate, for example, was funded by the notorious National Endowment for Democracy.” “In 2018,” added MacLeod, Machado “wrote a letter to Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, beseeching him to head a foreign military intervention in Venezuela.”

According to Barry Cannon, an assistant professor at the Centre for the Study of Politics from Maynooth University in Ireland, the mainstream media have continued to ignore Machado’s “profoundly anti-democratic animus while she simultaneously (mis)appropriates the banner of democracy as her own.” Like MacLeod, Cannon told ZNet that Machado has “consistently supported non-democratic methods of regime change, from indirect to direct economic and military intervention by the U.S.”

Joe Emersberger, who appears in the upcoming documentary ‘Venezuela: The Cost of Challenging an Empire’ filmed by journalist Nicholas Ford and myself, and is the co-author of ‘Extraordinary Threat: The US Empire, the media and twenty years of coup attempts in Venezuela’ told ZNet: “Machado has constantly called for foreign intervention. She has even done so in English.”

So why have González and Machado been more successful this time in claiming fraud, despite the presence of hundreds of international observers in Venezuela during the election? Why have all the other eight presidential candidates and their previous public pledges to respect the CNE’s decision been ignored in contrast to González and Machado’s Plataforma Unitaria Democrática (PUD) stance? According to Steve Ellner, a retired professor from the Universidad de Oriente who has lived in Venezuela for decades, “Washington and the mainstream media” have much to do with Machado’s success.

Writing in the NACLA Report on the Americas earlier this year (a publication which has no sympathy for Chavismo), Ellner noted that Francisco Palmieri — head of the U.S. mission for Venezuela located in Bogotá — was asked by a journalist if “any opposition candidate would satisfy the Biden administration.” Palmieri’s reply was clear and simple: “We have and will continue to support María Corina Machado as the candidate of the democratic opposition.” According to Ellner, out of the other opposition candidates, several were far more qualified than Machado and González while not all of them supported their policies for massive privatizations should they have won office.

Currently, seven opposition candidates, as well as Maduro, have presented their records to the Supreme Court after it ordered a full investigation into the election results and the CNE’s claims of a massive cyber-attack. According to  Reuters, “in Venezuela, voting machines print out three copies of voting records for the electoral authority, the ruling party and its challenger.” Machado and González for their part did not submit their results to the Supreme Court and, after calling on the military to abandon Maduro, have seen the country’s top prosecutor open a criminal investigation into them.

After the election, while both pro-government supporters and members of the opposition have been able to pull large numbers of demonstrators in their favor throughout the country, and have overwhelmingly marched peacefully, it has been the guarimberos whose images have been getting wide media coverage as they engage in street battles with local authorities.

Lionized by the media as heroes standing up to an authoritarian government, the guarimberos are balaclava wearing youths, with molotov cocktails and other homemade weapons, who are overwhelmingly hired from the slums by the far right to burn and damage government infrastructure. They have little in common with their fellow middle and upper class Venezuelans who want to see an end to the Maduro administration. In 2017, U.S. journalist Abby Martin interviewed many of these youths until her presence inside the country became known on social media and her own life was put at risk. 

According to journalist Brian Mier on the social platform X, after the election result was declared, among a long list, 12 universities, 7 public pre-schools, 21 elementary schools, 37 public health centers, a public pharmacy, 6 public food distribution centers, 11 Caracas metro stations, 1 community radio station, 38 buses and 27 monuments and statues were attacked or destroyed. Writer Vijay Prashard, who was in Venezuela as an international observer, notes that:

“‘At least two militants of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), Isabel Cirila Gil from Bolívar state and Mayauri Coromoto Silva Vilma from Aragua state, were assassinated in the aftermath of the election, two sergeants were killed, and other Chavistas, police, and officials were brutally beaten and captured.”

By 13 August, the country’s attorney general Tarek William Saab reported 25 people dead and 192 having been injured in the post-election violence. According to the Attorney General’s office, at least 2,200 people have been detailed.

Again, in our film Nicholas Ford and I document some of the historical violence in Venezuela by speaking to a few of the victims of the political murders perpetrated by the far-right. Our interviews with Inés Esparragoza, the mother of Orlando Figuera — a young Afro-Venezuelan man who was brutally burnt and stabbed to death in 2017 by right-wing thugs — and with Zulay Aguirre — the mother of parliamentarian Robert Serra who was murdered in his own home together with his assistant María Herrera — left no doubts who they considered responsible for the murders of their sons: i.e. leaders of the ultra-right in Venezuela who promote and fund such violence.

Speaking to ZNet, 69-year-old retiree Juan Montoya from a middle class suburb in Valencia, Estado Carabobo said: “The opposition has lost the streets in recent events as Chavismo has filled them. Of course, the opposition has people but most people in Venezuela do not accept violence.” Supportive of the government, in his view, what has occurred in Venezuela is a “coup produced by social media” while outside forces “clearly want to see a Guaidó 2.0” — a reference to the ultra-right politician Juan Guaidó who, in 2019, swore himself in as president with the backing of the Trump administration. 

Jimmy Acosta, another supporter of Maduro, said that the large demonstrations in favor of the government highlighted the backing the Bolivarian revolution still has and sent a “clear message to both the opposition and the international community.” Living in the lower middle-class area Montalbán and working as a public employee, Acosta, at age 49, added that “there is certainly a sector of the population that wants nothing to do with Chavismo,” however, “that’s not to say that all Venezuelans are against, that’s not true.” Acosta commented that he takes deep offense to the racism of the opposition given that he was “highly educated” and “proudly identified” with the Bolivarian revolution.

According to Darianny Flores, a 26-year-old university student from the affluent suburb of Bello Montes studying industrial relations at a private university, there is no “doubt there was the greatest fraud I have witnessed in my entire life.” Conceding it was the first election she ever voted in, Flores claimed her sister was “a member of the polling station in my town” and “everything indicated that Edmundo González had won in each table.” “During the last few years,” added Flores, “the opposition has gained strength” as “people have realized that the quality of life in the country has only worsened” while the “Chavistas” she knew “have definitively accepted that Maduro has led the country to misery, which is why now the opposition is getting bigger and bigger.”

In the working-class town Caricuao, Caraca, Joseph Castellanos — a 47-year-old worker in the informal economy — notes that while he has not “participated in pro-Maduro marches,” they “have blocked the numerous roads they march through.” “Like always,” said he, “historically, Chavismo has had marches which are very large and that’s not the exception now.”

In a similar manner, Castellanos told ZNet the opposition has had “very important marches.” In his view, judging which side gets more people onto the streets is “relative” and “hard to measure.” Asked if he believed there had been fraud in the elections, Catellanos said he wouldn’t be bold enough to make such a claim although “support for Maduro or Chavismo in general has declined a lot.” In his view, the problem with the opposition is they have long cried fraud but have never been able to prove it when the CNE releases its numbers. Castellanos is of the view that the contested election will be solved once the CNE releases its full numbers. 

According to Emersberger, in the event that Machado and González were to win, how could their victory ever be “seen as free and fair?” “Impossible,” claims Emersberger as, “how could anyone ever know if Venezuelans voted for them or merely voted for the end of murderous U.S. sanctions?” Estimates by the Centre for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in Washington note that due to the impact of U.S. sanctions, some “40,000 deaths from 2017 to 2018” occurred. As of April 2024, the United Nations Refugee Agency claims 7.7 million Venezuelans have left the country since 2014 making this “the largest exodus in Latin America’s recent history and one of the largest displacement crises in the world.”

At the Palacio de Miraflores — the official dispatch and head office of the President of Venezuela — Maduro and his advisers in the last few years have often struggled to contain the full impact of more than 900 U.S. economic sanctions, rampant inflation and a local business community which, despite some sections happily doing business with the government, are at their core committed to removing Chavismo from office.

Add to these issues Venezuela’s historic problems with corruption and the government’s dilemmas at times look completely unsolvable. Earlier this year, the country’s oil minister Tareck El Aissami was seen in handcuffs flanked by officers. According to the country’s top prosecutor, Attorney General Tarek William Saab, El Aissami is said to have had ties to an alleged scheme involving selling Venezuelan oil via the country’s cryptocurrency oversight body in parallel to the state-run Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA).


Due to the impact of sanctions, Maduro’s government argues it has been forced to make greater concessions to foreign companies looking to do business in Venezuela while embracing a de facto dollarization of the economy. Many of these policies have upset sections within the Chavista base. 

Despite all of these problems, by mid-2023 Maduro’s administration still built over 4.6 million housing units while continuing to invest in health, education and sport using state oil revenues. These policies are still widely popular with many Venezuelans. Historically, since Chavismo has long attempted to exert greater state control over the country’s natural resources such as oil, gas, bauxite, gold, and diamonds to fund the government’s programs, this popular control has always been the real crux of the conflict between the Chavistas, the extreme sectors of the opposition and the United States. Enjoying the world’s largest proven oil reserves, the government earlier this year claimed to have secured investments from the BRICS countries while Maduro declared: “Here there are two visions, two models: ours, of sovereignty and productive recovery, and theirs, which is all about looting and privatizing.”

For the next coming weeks though, attention will continue to turn towards the Supreme Court and its investigation into the election. On 5 August President of the Court, Caryslia Rodríguez, said her judicial body “will begin an examination of the material submitted for a period of up to 15 days, which may be extended.” Once the CNE’s full results, and alleged evidence of a serious cyber-attack are released, the world will know if Maduro won the election or if the claims of fraud by the U.S.-backed opposition, for once, have any substance.

Editor’s update: On Aug 22, the Venezuelan Supreme Court issued its judgment about the validity of the electoral council’s official result, agreeing that it is valid. However, the official voting center tallies have still not been published.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Colombians Welcome Chiquita’s Guilty Verdict, But Thousands More Deserve Justice

By Rodrigo Acuña

Truthout

14 June 2024

Chiquita, a Swiss-domiciled U.S. transnational corporation that is one of the world’s largest producers of bananas, has recently been found guilty in a Florida court for funding paramilitaries in the South American country of Colombia. On June 10, in the case Doe v. Chiquita Brands International, a jury declared that the corporation, which has headquarters in both Switzerland and Florida, must pay $38 million in damages to the relatives of eight Colombian men murdered by the paramilitary group United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC).

The decision marks a rare finding against a private company for human rights abuses in another country.

Speaking to Truthout, Dan Kovalik — an adjunct professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh — said he “welcomed the verdict against Chiquita Brands International.” Having previously worked on cases against Coca-Cola Company, Drummond Company and Occidental Petroleum for human rights abuses in Colombia, Kovalik told Truthout that Chiquita also supplied the paramilitaries with “3000 Kalashnikov rifles which Israel provided.”

According to CNN, on June 10 the jury established that “Chiquita knowingly provided substantial assistance to the AUC to a degree sufficient to create a foreseeable risk of harm to others.” With the case heard in the Southern District of Florida, Chiquita’s leaders told Newsweek that they were “disappointed by the decision.”

The fruit company added: “The situation in Colombia was tragic for so many, including those directly affected by the violence there, and our thoughts remain with them and their families. However, that does not change our belief that there is no legal basis for these claims.”

This latest statement by Chiquita seeks to erase the reality that in 2007 the company actually pleaded guilty to a U.S. criminal charge of carrying out transactions with a foreign terrorist organization, as the AUC has been categorised by the State Department in 2001. During the 2007 finding, Chiquita agreed to pay a fine of $25 million.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice:

“From sometime in 1997 through Feb. 4, 2004 – Chiquita paid money to the AUC in two regions of the Republic of Colombia where Chiquita had banana-producing operations: Urabá and Santa Marta. Chiquita made these payments through its wholly-owned Colombian subsidiary known as ‘Banadex.’ By 2003, Banadex was Chiquita’s most profitable operation. Chiquita, through Banadex, paid the AUC nearly every month. In total, Chiquita made over 100 payments to the AUC amounting to over $1.7 million.”

While Chiquita conceded to criminal conduct in 2007, for 17 years the corporation battled the relatives of the AUC victims. Now, according to Marco Simons, one of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, “these families, victimized by armed groups and corporations, asserted their power and prevailed in the judicial process.”

The brutality of the paramilitaries whom Chiquita paid was noted by CNN in the recent trial. One banana plantation worker, simply referred to as “David,” “saw his bus stopped at checkpoint in the coastal region of Urabá.” Forcefully removed from the vehicle, he was then “beaten to death in front of his fellow passengers, and dumped on the side of the road — where his killers covered his corpse with a banana plant. Cows would later feed on his body, according to court documents.”

Like Kovalik, Guillermo Andrés Mosquera Miranda — a Colombian trade union leader and high school principal, who is currently in Australia requesting political asylum and public support — welcomed the decision against Chiquita and noted its wider implications. Mosquera was forced to seek political asylum after assassins with links to a paramilitary group with ties to ex-president of Colombia Álvaro Uribe Vélez attempted to kill him due to his lack of cooperation with their corruption and standover tactics. Speaking to Truthout about the ruling against Chiquita, Mosquera said:

“This decision is a historic event and the starting point for the Colombian Institutions in charge of justice to investigate and take measures against the actors who finance state terrorism. At the same time, the thesis of the participation of multinationals in the conflict, widely denounced by human rights organizations, is proven.”

According to Kovalik, Chiquita’s actions “led to the takeover of large swaths of land in Colombia by the paramilitaries” while, recently on X, Colombian Sen. Wilson Arias claimed, “In 1994, Chiquita Brands donated $5,935 to Álvaro Uribe’s campaign for the governorship, according to a document from the National Security Archive.”

Uribe, who served as president from 2002 to 2010, was supported by the administration of George W. Bush and, according to many human rights organizations, presided over some of the worst human rights violations in Colombia’s history. Uribe himself was accused of having strong ties to the drug trade and was eventually placed under house arrest for wiretapping.

In the Colombian Senate, Arias also recently called out Chiquita for rebranding itself given it was responsible for the 1928 massacre in the town of Ciénaga near Santa Marta when it traded under the name of the United Fruit Company. Noting how the massacre in Ciénaga was depicted in Gabriel García Márquez’s novel One Hundred Years of Solitude, according to Kovalik: “The victims numbered into the thousands. It’s unknown because the bodies were disappeared.”

Kovalik noted that the United Fruit Company was also pivotal in the 1954 coup d’état in Guatemala against the democratically elected leftist President Jacobo Árbenz. With the country then ruled for several decades by a military junta that murdered approximately 200,000 Indigenous Guatemalans, Kovalik added the events are “now considered a genocide.”

In Colombia, Diana Carolina Alfonso, a journalist for the weekly newspaper Voz, told Truthout that the debates around Chiquita’s corporate practices in her country can be traced back to the days of the United Fruit Company, when lawyer Jorge Eliecer Gaitán called for accountability for those involved in the Ciénaga massacre. Alfonso notes that Gaitán, who was once a congressman, launched the “debate on the banana massacre” before he himself was murdered in 1948 while running as a presidential candidate in that year’s election.

The problem since that first debate until now, according to Alfonso, is that the Colombian judiciary has failed to hold accountable key domestic state actors in collaboration with foreign corporations, the private sector and paramilitary groups. Earlier this week, Alfonso noted that the progressive president of Colombia Gustavo Perto “has called on the judiciary to move with speed” in these types of cases, “such as one currently taking place against Coca-Cola Company.”

In the case of the banana company, Kovalik believes this is just the beginning of legal actions as “there are many more cases out there waiting for Chiquita” given that the victims “number into the thousands.” According to Colombia Reports, the paramilitary group AUC “left as many as 4,900 victims in Colombia’s Caribbean region.” These cases, said Kovalik, will either go to trial or be settled.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Harms of US Blockade Against Cuba Compound as Food and Energy Crises Spread

By Rodrigo Acuña

Truthout

20 April 2024

The island of Cuba is going through its worst economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. A few weeks ago, the government in Havana officially requested powdered milk for children under the age of 7 from the United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP). By mid-March, as noted by CBS News, “small groups of protesters took to the streets in the eastern city of Santiago” criticizing the “power outages lasting up to eight hours,” as well as the food shortages across the country. In late March, an emergency 715,000 barrels of crude arrived at the port of Matanzas from Russia — the country’s first oil shipment to Cuba in a year — while China has recently agreed to deliver 70 tonnes of rice, the first of six shipments totaling 400 tonnes.

In New York, in an act of solidarity, The People’s Forum (a local NGO) has started a campaign called “Let Cuba Live: Bread for Our Neighbors” with the aim of sending “800 tons of wheat flour to Cuba as legal humanitarian aid.”

Zuldaimis Biart, a 35-year-old accountant who lives in Havana, told Truthout that the current crisis “is directly affecting low-income people, workers, mothers with children and the elderly.” In her personal case, her salary did “not support the minimum needs such as food, medicine, personal hygiene, clothing and basic footwear.”

Biart noted that not everyone has access to the digital convertible currency known as “MLC” (free convertible currency) that was introduced three years ago, as not everyone is receiving remittances from relatives abroad. Arguing that the conditions in education and the public health care system are deteriorating, Biart thinks this is because “all state institutions are suffering from mass emigration and lack of resources.”

Asiel Álvarez, a 34-year-old construction worker from Havana, told Truthout that he is also under stress due to the recent changes in Cuba’s monetary system, explaining that his “salary has no value to buy any products.” According to Álvarez, the power shortages are now constant.

Commenting in the Boston Globe on her recent trip to Cuba, Micho Spring — a communications strategist for the marketing firm Weber Shandwick — noted that much rubbish can be seen around Havana while public transport has significantly diminished its operations. “Outside Havana,” wrote Spring, “I was struck by how thin people appear.”

Three years ago, when protests broke out in cities throughout Cuba against the country’s ongoing power outages and over all declining economic situation, President Miguel Díaz-Canel quickly took to the streets of Havana where the demonstrations originated. In some heated conversations with local residents, which were filmed by Cuban state television, Díaz-Canel presented the government’s perspective of the crisis. “My dear, we’ve had to cut the power out because we don’t have enough fuel!” he told a visibly distressed senior citizen. In a region where presidents rarely show their faces during a crisis, let alone meet with protestors, Díaz’s move displayed political courage. Today though, the crisis continues.

Venezuela’s oil production is at its lowest rate in decades due to harsh U.S. economic sanctions and Washington’s seizure of the country’s oil company CITGO. Cuba, which relies heavily on Venezuelan oil imports, has been impacted by this development for several years, sending it into an energy crisis. Adding to its woes, the island has yet to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic that forced it to shut down its tourism industry (the largest sector of its economy) as it quarantined itself off from the outside world.

By January 2021, in an attempt to stabilize the economy, the government ended more than 25 years of a dual currency circulation and reverted to using the Cuban peso (CUP), which at the time had an exchange rate of 24 for a U.S. dollar. Making matters more complicated, with the Cuban convertible peso (CUC) abolished, the government introduced a new digital currency known as the MLC. With inflation increasing 70 percent by the end of 2021 alone, the government’s move proved widely unpopular among average Cubans and by early February 2024, Economy Minister Alejandro Gil was sacked. Now, according to a statement by the Cuban government, the minister is being investigated as the “leadership of our Party and government has never allowed, nor will it ever allow, the proliferation of corruption, simulation and insensitivity.”

The greatest culprit of Cuba’s economic hardships, however, is the United States government, which has imposed a harsh economic blockade on the island for over 62 years. In April 1960, in a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Lester D. Mallory, the U.S. official noted that the majority of Cubans supported the young revolutionary leader Fidel Castro, whose 26 of July Movement had overthrown the brutal Washington-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in January 1959. Based on his analysis, Mallory wrote:

“Every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba. If such a policy is adopted, it should be the result of a positive decision which would call forth a line of action which, while as adroit and inconspicuous as possible, makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.”

During the Cold War, Cuba managed to lessen the full impact of the U.S. economic blockade by trading with Socialist bloc countries. With the Soviet Union buying Cuban sugar, nickel ores, rum and tobacco at preferential prices, from 1960 to 1985, according to one expert, “the total amount of Soviet sugar subsidies exceeded 22 billion dollars.” In 1992, one year after the collapse of the Soviet Union plunged Cuba’s economy into a major crisis known as the “special period,” U.S. filmmaker Jon Alpert asked Fidel Castro for a comment on the economy. Castro’s reply was simple: “Our problem is the blockade and the end of the Socialist Bloc,” he said, “85 percent of our commerce was with the socialist countries.”

By 1996, with the introduction of the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton Act, the economic noose around Cuba tightened. Passed by Congress and enacted by President Bill Clinton, those acts established that any non-U.S. business that deals with Cuba can be subjected to legal actions. In a report for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, commenting on the Helms-Burton Act, Spanish politician Fernando González Laxe noted that the “extraterritorial dimension of the legislation manifests itself in the fact that third country companies can be sued in US courts, and their executives, along with their families, barred from entering the United States.” For González Laxe, “Canadian, European and Latin American companies and citizens would be the most concerned.”

When President Barack Obama visited Cuba in 2016 and eased the blockade, one commentator noted that: “History’s longest standing sanctions regime was not completely dismantled, but the progress was immense, with benefits seen almost immediately by Cuban workers.” The respite for Cubans, though, would be short lived.

Salim Lamrani, author of numerous books on Cuba and a lecturer at the University of La Réunion, told Truthout that under Donald Trump, “Washington returned to the policy of confrontation and imposed 243 new sanctions in four years, more than one sanction per week, targeting vital sectors of the Cuban economy, such as the export of medical services, tourism and remittances.” Among those sanctions, Lamrani noted, “Fifty were imposed in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, depriving the island of vital equipment such as ventilators and severely affecting the health system.”

Worse, in 2021 the Trump administration put Cuba back on the list of states that the U.S. accuses of sponsoring terrorism. Antoni Kapcia, professor emeritus at the University of Nottingham, told Truthout that while this move is “not supported by the European Union, Canada or the United Kingdom,” it has “affected European operations in Cuba, with European banks and insurance companies refusing to process payments to Cuban entities or to give insurance cover for stays in Cuba.” According to Kapcia, placing Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism “made it even more difficult than it already was before 2017 for Cuba to buy and pay for imports (notably oil, medicines and food products), contributing substantially to the deep worsening of the economic situation.”

Asked to comment on why the Biden administration did not revert to Obama’s previous policies toward Cuba, Helen Yaffe, author of We Are Cuba! How a Revolutionary People Have Survived in a Post-Soviet World, told Truthout that, while “initially Biden did not make significant changes to the country’s Cuba policy” after the protests of July 11, 2021, “Biden was clearly advised that the revolutionary state was vulnerable and close to collapse, and he wouldn’t have to do much to take the credit as the U.S. president who finally oversaw the collapse of Cuban socialism.” While, according to Yaffe, the idea that the state was close to collapse is inaccurate, the Biden administration has doubled down by adding some sanctions of its own.

Now, with over 400,000 Cubans leaving the island between 2022 and late 2023, and the United States in an election year, Yaffe notes that Biden has taken some measures to “reduce Cuban immigration to the U.S.,” however, he has not removed the “causes that drive that migration; that is the shortages and hardships largely caused by the U.S. blockade.” According to the United Nations, the six-decade U.S. financial and trade embargo on Cuba had cost the island’s economy $130 billion by 2018.

The despair and anger of Cubans citizens that Truthout spoke to is palpable.

“I don’t see a future for the population,” said Asiel Álvarez, the construction worker from Havana. “And in my case, I don’t see a future.”

A 61-year-old former school teacher, Yolanda Sánchez preferred to speak to Truthout under a pseudonym, since she relies on the Cuban government to renew her licence to run a small bed and breakfast establishment in old Havana.

Sánchez conceded that, “During the presidency of Barack Obama, there was a flourishing in the Cuban economy and there were more opportunities to start businesses in the private sector, as well as the acquisition of basic necessities for the people.” In Sánchez’s view, the COVID-19 pandemic was disastrous, as was the government’s timing shortly afterwards in making the monetary changes it made.

She states that the “whole system collapsed” while the cost of everything increased: “food, medicine, housing, environmental hygiene.” From Sánchez’s perspective, inflation has not stopped while the “state itself has increased the price of basic necessities.”

Carlos Rivera is 40-year-old health care worker at a public hospital in Havana, who also requested to use a pseudonym. For Rivera:

“Today there is no end to the crisis, we don’t know where all this is going to end. We see that hospitals are being silenced, when health services are an important source of foreign currency for the country and are not even capable of at least improving the working conditions of those who work in that sector. The oil crisis, on the other hand, is hitting us hard. The issue of transport is very serious.”

According to Rivera, people in Havana can spend up to three hours waiting for public transport — time they wish they could use for other purposes.

Communicating with Truthout, Iramís Rosique Cárdenas — a Cuban journalist from the Cuba-based media collective La Tizza — said “right now, there is also a strong problem of supply of the regulated basic basket (a subsidized food bag), for example, the April rice, a staple food, has not arrived.” In his view, “the future of our world is uncertain” as “any opportunity for the future for us depends on Cuba being able to complete its insertion in the world market (with all that this will imply for better and for worse), something that the economic war to which we are subjected prevents.”

For Fulton Armstrong, a senior fellow of the Latin American program at American University in Washington and a former member of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) which reported to the CIA, despite factors like the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuela’s economic crisis and the Cuban government’s own economic errors and lack of reforms, the number one factor in the island’s current woes remains the U.S. economic blockade. Speaking recently to the German public broadcaster DW, Armstrong noted that while some protests against the Cuban government have been spontaneous expressions of people’s frustrations, others have been carefully planned and supported by external actors thorough the use of social media and bot accounts. The National Endowment for Democracy, according to Armstrong, is one such actor interested in seeing the overthrow of the Cuban government — having spent $600 million over the years on “promoting democracy” (i.e. trying to overthrow the current Cuban political system) on the island.

During the Cold War, the United States promoted similar campaigns against the Cuban revolution. After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Washington ignored blatant acts of terrorism committed by elements of the Cuban hard right exile community in Miami, Florida, up through the 1997 Cuba hotel bombings (the last acts of terrorism against the island). In 1971, the CIA and an anti-Castro group were accused of having introduced African swine fever virus into the island, which resulted in the forced slaughter of 500,000 pigs to prevent a full-scale animal epidemic.

In 2017, the Cuban government claimed “a balance of 3,478 deaths and 2,099 disabled persons” due to acts of terrorism against Cuba “for defending its independence, sovereignty and dignity.”

According to Fabián Escalante Font, founder of the Cuban intelligence services and ex-head of the Cuban State Security Department, from the early 1960s to 2000, Cuban authorities also registered 637 assassination plots against Fidel Castro.

Still, throughout this campaign of violence toward the island, brutal economic sanctions have remained the core of U.S. policy towards Cuba. Now, 62 years after the U.S. first imposed the blockade, it appears that some of the more widespread societal breakdown that the U.S. has tried for decades to foment may be at risk of taking hold.

For those familiar with the achievements of the Cuban revolution and the often widespread abysmal economic conditions for most peoples of the Caribbean and Latin America, a collapse of Cuban society would be highly regrettable. For average Cubans, it would be catastrophic.

In 2022, Newsweek noted that the average Cuban was still living three years longer than the average citizen from the United States, whose life expectancy at birth was 76.1 years. In 2016, when Fidel Castro died at the age of 90, another press article noted Cuba’s achievements in the field of medicine, which included being the first country to eliminate HIV transmission from mother to child, lower infant mortality rates and developing a lung cancer vaccine.

In 2000, Cuban educator Leonela Relys Díaz developed the Yo, sí puedo (Yes, I can) literacy program which, by 2014, had helped 6 million people learn how to read and write in 28 different countries — including Aboriginal communities in Australia.

Global corporations and Cuban American hard right lobby groups in Miami, Florida, are all eager to reassert their dominance on the island. Were the Cuban Revolution to collapse, one would struggle to see such achievements survive.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

50 years on, Australia still schtum on aiding the violent Pinochet coup in Chile

By RODRIGO ACUÑA

Crikey

11 September 2023

Today marks 50 years since the Washington-backed junta headed by general Augusto Pinochet violently overthrew Chile’s democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende in 1973. In recent years, I have been repeatedly asked by a few Australian journalists and politicians one question: is there anything new to report on Canberra’s connection to the coup in Chile?

For those unfamiliar as to why such a question would be asked, in 2017 University of New South Wales professor of politics Clinton Fernandes, together with barrister Ian Latham and solicitor Hugh Macken, took action to declassify early-1970s reports of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) station in Santiago, Chile — which assisted the CIA’s destabilisation of the Chilean government ahead of the military coup against Salvador.

On June 2 2021, the Coalition released the Australian government’s Santiago station reports to Fernandes and his lawyers. These documents — unlike previous evidence gathered by journalists Brian Toohey and William Pinwill in Oyster: The Story of The Australian Secret Intelligence Service — revealed technical information about the activities of ASIS in Chile, including communication delays, station vehicle deliveries, agent lodging and observations such as “fluent knowledge of Spanish in SANTIAGO is a necessity”.

While these revelations conclusively confirmed Canberra’s role in supporting Allende’s ousting, the partially successful declassification of ASIS files was short-lived. 

On November 1 2021, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal handed down a ruling indicating that its full release of documents regarding ASIS operations in Chile between 1971 and 1974, plus records about the violent overthrow of the Popular Unity administration, would “cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth”.

“It shows that the Australian government fears the people who elect it,” Fernandes said when asked about this ruling. He added that Canberra knows “Australians would never tolerate such contemptible acts if they knew what these agencies were up to. The secrecy protects policymakers from democratic scrutiny and accountability, but this is not national security in any meaningful sense”.

Writing in The Nation last month, Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive at George Washington University, stated:

“Both the CIA and the ASIS continue to hide operational records that include numerous intelligence reports from the Australian covert operatives to their CIA counterparts on meetings with Chilean assets embedded within the armed forces, the newspaper El Mercurio — a recipient of CIA funding — and the Christian Democratic party, among other key CIA-connected organizations in Chile.”

Kornbluh’s analysis is important because declassifying ASIS files could deeply embarrass Canberra, especially since one ASIS agent is alleged to have remained in Chile after the coup in September, when it would have been impossible not to have witnessed the junta’s reign of terror — or, worse as a foreign agent, aided it.  

Here in Sydney, after the ASIS reports were made public, I wrote to then-minister Marise Payne at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), requesting the full declassification of its files on Chile, as well as an apology from Canberra to the Chilean Australian community for intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign democratic state.

While the first letter (September 17 2021) was co-signed by more than 60 Chilean Australians, the second correspondence (November 9 2021) was supported by 269 people, many of whom had been arrested, brutally tortured or subjected to political persecution under Chilean dictatorship. To date, DFAT has only replied to the first letter, arguing that since the issue of declassifying ASIS’ Santiago station reports was still a matter being heard at the AAT, it was not able to comment.

Another matter of interest to the local community is the request by Chile’s Supreme Court to extradite former Sydney nanny Adriana Rivas, an ex-member of Pinochet’s notorious Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (Directorate of National Intelligence, or DINA).

Rivas, currently in a Sydney women’s prison since her arrest in February 2019, is awaiting extradition to Chile where she stands accused of kidnapping and torture offences against seven members of the Chilean Communist Party. Among her alleged victims was a young woman named Reinalda Pereira who was six months pregnant at the time of her disappearance.

Rivas’ presence in Australia, where she has lived since 1978, could be embarrassing for Canberra. Lawyer Adriana Navarro of Navarro Associates, who represents the families of Rivas’ alleged victims in Chile as a legal observer here in Sydney, notes:

“Rivas was an operative agent of the DINA and trained with them in intelligence at Tejas Verdes barracks. Her official title was as a secretary, but she worked for the Lautaro Brigade under instructions from major Juan Morales Salgado, who worked for Manuel Contreras. She provided security to Contreras and his family, and to Pinochet when he travelled overseas.”

During Pinochet’s reign, Manuel Contreras led the DINA and was the second-most powerful man in Chile. Contreras died in 2015 while serving a prison sentence of more than 500 years for crimes against humanity, including the kidnapping, forced disappearance and assassination of Pinochet’s opponents.

On September 4 2023, Navarro Associates sent a strongly worded letter to Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus, questioning why Rivas’ extradition to Chile has not proceeded despite “more than 15 months [elapsing] since Ms Rivas exhausted all judicial avenues to stop this extradition”.

When asked how an intelligence agent like Rivas could originally have entered Australia, Fernandes said: “While there may be a benign explanation, the affair cries out for answers.”

“Were people like her given special preference over the victims of torture, and was she protected by the intelligence agencies in the past?”

Back in Chile, the events of the September 11 coup continue to have relevance. Late last month, retired brigadier Hernán Chacón Soto was sentenced to “15 years for aggravated homicide and 10 years for aggravated kidnapping” for his role in the murder of the popular singer-songwriter Víctor Jara. But before being transferred to prison, Soto, like many other retired colonels and generals who worked for Pinochet and faced incarceration, took his own life.

Here in Australia, to mark 50 years since the coup d’état, members of the Chilean Australian community have organised public events at the Parliament of New South Wales, the Victoria Trades Hall, the University of Sydney and the Salvador Allende Memorial, which can be found at Fairfield Park in western Sydney. Events in Adelaide, Brisbane and Perth will also be held.

At these locations, we will remember how the brutal overthrow of Allende resulted in “about 4000 cases of death or disappearance by the [Pinochet] regime, between 150,000 and 200,000 cases of political detention, and approximately 100,000 credible cases of torture”, as noted by Fernandes.

We will also continue to wait for Canberra to further declassify ASIS records and to apologise for the destruction of democracy in our homeland of origin.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Who ousted Peru's president of the poor?

By Rodrigo Acuña

Eureka Street

9 March 2023

In the last two months, the political crisis in Peru has regularly made it into the mainstream media. On 7 December last year, the democratically elected Peruvian president Pedro Castillo was removed from power after he attempted to temporarily suspend Congress hours before his third impeachment hearing.

As the first person from an impoverished rural background to become president in Peru, Castillo had found widespread support in the country’s poorer regions. His ousting has sparked mass demonstrations and blockades across the country, with protestors calling for President Dina Boluarte, Castillo’s vice-president who replaced him, to step down and for early elections to be called. As of mid-February, 60 people have been killed, the majority of whom were protesters killed by state forces. But the country's copious copper resources, coupled with the interests of multinational mining corporations, have left many wondering about United States' involvement.

According to The Economist, Peru ‘remains riven by unrest since the “self-coup” and subsequent arrest of its president in December’. Tom Phillips, The Guardian’s chief foreign correspondent in Latin America, recently claimed in The Observer that the city of Juliaca has ‘been taken over by teams of anti-government rebels who have been in open revolt against President Dina Boluarte’ — and yet Phillips failed to provide a shred of evidence that the protesters could reasonably be classified as ‘rebels’. Reports like those found in The Economist and The Observer fail to discuss basic questions that should always be asked when reporting on Latin American politics — for example, what were the policies of ex-president Pedro Castillo and what were the true motivations for his removal? What are the political ideologies of Dina Boluarte, who is now in power? And what is the position of the US regarding the change of regime in Peru? Further queries might focus on why Peru has been engulfed by such widespread demonstrations in the wake of Castillo’s impeachment and imprisonment, and what are the socioeconomic origins of the demonstrators versus those who have taken power. The answers to such questions inevitably expose political machinations of a kind seen far too often in Latin American political history. 

The day before Castillo’s failed manoeuvre to dissolve Congress, the US ambassador to the country Lisa Kenna met with the minister of defence Gustavo Bobbio Rosas. The details of what was discussed in that meeting are not officially known; however, the following day, on 7 December 2022, Kenna wrote on her Twitter page: ‘The United States categorically rejects any extra-constitutional act by President Castillo to prevent Congress from fulfilling its mandate.’

Kenna’s statement was made in reference to Castillo’s action earlier in the day, prior to his arrest. With his hands clearly shaking, the nervous president had read a statement on camera, attempting to use Article 134 of the constitution to temporarily close down Congress for obstructionism to his government. But without the support of his ministers and the military, the impeachment process went ahead. Castillo was detained by local police and his own security team — reportedly on his way to the Mexican embassy in Lima to seek political asylum — and imprisoned in the same prison that holds ex-President Alberto Fujimori.

Castillo, unlike his political competitor, came from humble roots, the son of illiterate peasant farmers. Prior to running as a presidential candidate, from 1995 until almost the time of Peru’s massive teachers strike in 2017, in which he played a key role as a union organiser, Castillo worked as a rural school teacher in the town of Puña in the north of the country.

As a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer, Ambassador Kenna’s comment backing Peru’s right-wing controlled Congress is not surprising. Castillo represented everything the US as well as local elites in Lima have historically abhorred.

Castillo had triumphed in the June 2021 presidential election by a small margin of 44,000 votes over the hard-right candidate Keiko Fujimori (daughter of the jailed ex-President). Castillo, unlike his political competitor, came from humble roots, the son of illiterate peasant farmers. Prior to running as a presidential candidate, from 1995 until almost the time of Peru’s massive teachers strike in 2017, in which he played a key role as a union organiser, Castillo worked as a rural school teacher in the town of Puña in the north of the country. Reflecting on his life after winning the election, Castillo wrote:

‘It was a great accomplishment for me to finish high school, which I did thanks to the help of my parents and my brothers and sisters. I continued my education, doing what I could to earn a living. I worked in the coffee fields. I came to Lima to sell newspapers. I sold ice cream. I cleaned toilets in hotels. I saw the harsh reality for workers in the countryside and the city.’

Criticising the 1993 constitution established under the US-backed Fujimori, Castillo said: ‘It treats healthcare as a service, not a right. It treats education as a service, not a right. And it is designed for the benefit of businesses, not people.’ At the end of his statement the president-elect declared: ‘No more poor people in a rich country. I give you my word as a teacher.’

Once in office, with his minister for foreign affairs Héctor Béjar, Castillo withdrew Peru from the Lima Group, a pro-US multilateral body established in 2017 to promote the overthrow of the Maduro administration in Venezuela.  After serving for just 19 days, Béjar — a respected left-wing intellectual and ex-guerrilla — was forced to resign after the Navy took offence to comments he made about the civil war Peru had endured during the 1980s. 

The credibility of other ministers Castillo had appointed was then called into question. According to Francisco Dominguez, a senior lecturer at Middlesex University, that ‘Congress’s harassment [was] aimed at preventing Castillo’s government from even functioning can be verified with numbers: in the 495 days he lasted in office, Castillo was forced to appoint a total of 78 ministers.’

Commenting on these developments to Eureka Street, political commentator and Peru Liber affiliate Didier Ortiz notes that Castillo launched an agrarian reform (the second since the rule of progressive military leader Juan Velasco Alvarado in the 1970s); however, ‘any advance on this project was put on an indefinite pause due to the coup’. He adds: ‘Castillo's presidential powers were abrogated piecemeal every month since he took office by the fascist Congress.’

BHP, Rio Tinto and Glencore, the world’s three largest transnational mining corporations, have extensive operations in Peru and given the lucrative profits involved, it is not surprising that the industry supported the removal of Castillo.

By August 2021, according to another observer, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers stated it would commence the collection of all debts amounting to millions of dollars owed to the National Superintendency of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT). Based on this decision, two private mining giants, ‘one of them 53 percent US-owned’, would have had to pay ‘multimillion tax debts [that had] never been collected by previous governments.’

In November 2021, in another important development, the handover of Block 1 in the Talara basin to the state-owned energy company Petroperú occurred. After a 25 year-long hiatus due to privatisation, Castillo claimed this was a ‘big step of returning Petroperú to productive activities’ which would eventually ‘produce to supply the national market, benefiting millions of Peruvian families.’

Not surprisingly, none of these policies were supported by Peru’s ultra-right Congress, which twice attempted to bring impeachment proceedings against Castillo before finally succeeding.

On January 18, as noted by journalist Ben Norton, Kenna met with Peru’s minister for energy and mining alongside the country’s vice-minister of hydrocarbons and the vice-minister of mining. According to Peru’s Ministry of Energy and Mines, the meeting with Kenna revolved around ‘investment’ opportunities and plans to ‘develop’ and ‘expand’ the extractive industries. Interestingly, earlier in the same month, Kenna stated on her Twitter account that the Biden administration was giving the Boluarte regime an additional $US8 million to support the reduction of illegal coca cultivation (a source of cocaine).

Beneath the surface of Peru’s volatile politics lie its rich deposits of natural resources, particularly copper, gold and other metals, as well as Liquified Natural Gas — all of which are strategically highly important and in increasing demand in the world’s current political climate. In the shift towards renewable energy sources, for example, copper is essential in the storage and transport of that energy — indeed, with its unique and versatile properties, copper is arguably the most important metal to modern civilisation. BHP, Rio Tinto and Glencore, the world’s three largest transnational mining corporations, have extensive operations in Peru and given the lucrative profits involved, it is not surprising that the industry supported the removal of Castillo as did the Trudeau government given ‘Canadian companies are Peru’s largest investors in mineral exploration’, according to journalist Camila Escalante.

With Castillo’s push for Peruvian ownership of resources and ‘renegotiation of mining contracts, an increase in company taxes, and potential nationalisation of mines’, the successful coup against him has certainly removed a threat to US interests and the profit margins of transnational mining corporations.

From Ortiz’s perspective, the ‘Peruvian population has grown accustomed to changing presidents on a yearly basis so I cannot imagine Boluarte staying in office beyond 2023.’ For now, the anti-government protests in Peru and their violent repression by security forces appear to have no end in sight, with vast numbers of people calling for Castillo’s liberation, new elections and the redrawing of a new constitution. While time will reveal if some or all of these demands are met, it should be clear the hard-right forces that removed Castillo last year have the backing of Washington.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Protests Continue in Peru as Newly Installed Government Cracks Down After Coup

By Rodrigo Acuña

TRUTHOUT

23 December 2022

On December 7, a soft coup took place in Peru involving the impeachment of the country’s President Pedro Castillo by the right-wing national Congress and his arrest by local police in Lima. Since then, the nation has exploded into massive protests followed by serious repression by government authorities. As of December 21, some 26 people have been killed and up to 500 protesters and security forces injured due to the violence while key roads throughout the country have been blocked. With five airports forced to close due to demonstrations, Peru’s Defense Minister Luis Alberto Otárola has declared a 30-day state of emergency, deploying the army throughout the Andean nation.

In Peru’s southern city of Ayacucho, seven protesters were killed by the military in just one day. More recently, two ministers from the new government headed by former Vice President Dina Boluarte have resigned: Education Minister Patricia Correa and Culture Minister Jair Pérez Brañez. Correa wrote on Twitter that she renounced her ministry because the “death of compatriots has no justification. State violence cannot be disproportionate and cause death.”

In a video circulating on social media, a Peruvian colonel, Guilmar Trujillo Lafitte, has apparently come out rejecting the state of emergency “that prevents the free expression of popular discontent in the face of the lack of legitimacy of the congress of the republic as well as Mrs. Dina Boluarte.” The colonel calls for new elections as well as the resignations of Peru’s minister of defense and the minister of interior — traditionally among the most powerful ministries in Latin American countries, given these positions are in charge of domestic security.

For many observers of Latin American politics, Castillo’s downfall could have been predicted long ago. Having won the June 2021 presidential election by a margin of just 44,000 votes out of nearly 19 million cast, Castillo, a former rural school teacher, only narrowly defeated his hard-right opponent Keiko Fujimori, daughter of the ex-dictator Alberto Fujimori. While Castillo’s leftist Free Peru Party was the largest in the country’s incoming Congress with 37 seats, his new government still faced a hostile far right majority headed by 24 members of Fujimori’s Popular Force, the second-largest party.

Using its power almost immediately, 15 days after Castillo’s appointment Congress and the Navy managed to pressure Foreign Relations Minister Héctor Béjar — a respected left-wing academic and intellectual — to resign based on his previous assertion that the use of terrorism in the country was first implemented in 1974 by Peru’s Navy, six years before the appearance of the bloody Maoist guerrilla group Shining Path in 1980.

While Béjar’s assertion is not conclusively supported by research, as government authorities’ involvement in state terror is predominantly documented from 1975 onward, discussions around Peru’s internal conflict from 1980 to 2000, between a right-wing U.S.-backed state and the Shining Path guerrillas and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), are highly controversial throughout society. In 2003 a Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that 69,280 people died or were disappeared in the conflict, with 46 percent of deaths attributed to the Shining Path and 30 percent to state agents. While Alberto Fujimori has long taken credit for defeating the guerrilla movements in Peru, in 2009 he was sentenced to 25 years prison for human rights crimes. Since then, his daughter Keiko has vigorously campaigned for his release and harshly attacked figures like Béjar who may try and point out the complexities of the conflict and critique the role of state forces.

Writing on Castillo’s fall, Latin American scholar Francisco Dominguez, a senior lecturer at Middlesex University, has recently noted: “Congress’ harassment aimed at preventing Castillo’s government from even functioning can be verified with numbers: in the 495 days he lasted in office, Castillo was forced to appoint a total of 78 ministers.” These appointments predominantly occurred due to Castillo capitulating to pressures that a right-wing Congress, the business community and the media placed on his original ministerial appointments as well as due to the infighting, fracturing and corruption that took place within his own party ranks.

Speaking to Truthout, Martin Scurrah, a retired Flinders University lecturer and expert on Peru, observed that for his part, “Castillo had limited political experience, mainly as leader of a teachers’ strike.” In fact, the former educator was not even a member of the political party whose banner he ran and won under in the 2021 presidential election. Scurrah adds: “In addition to the ceaseless opposition in congress and the media, Castillo proved to be inept and incompetent as president, unable to convert the support from teachers and people in rural areas, especially from the south of the country, into a coalition of support to enable him to govern.”

Furthermore, according to Scurrah, while Castillo was “unable to carry out any of the [structural] reforms he espoused in his political campaign, symbolically he represented and stood for the poor and marginalized, especially from rural areas, and in many specific decisions by his ministers did defend the rights of the poor.”

Speaking to Democracy Now!, Javier Puente, an associate professor and chair of Latin American and Latino studies at Smith College, noted Castillo’s “evangelical orientation,” which, in his opinion, “made him really socially conservative.” In addition, for Puente, the fact that Castillo was a former rondero campesino militia member is problematic, as ronderos “continue to be a form of paramilitarism” that “should come under scrutiny.” (Campesino militias played a large role in the civil war in Peru between 1980 and 2000.)

Taking the complexity of Castillo’s record into account, on December 7, Castillo gambled his presidency by attempting to shut down Congress using Article 134, which is allowed in cases of obstructionism by Congress. “Castillo’s decision to dissolve Congress was not supported or even known to his cabinet or most of his advisers, all of whom were convinced that the third attempt to impeach him did not have sufficient votes to be successful,” said Scurrah. “Thus, it seems to have been a personal, desperate decision supported by a very small group.”

According to Peruvian sociologist Eduardo González Cueva, while Castillo could be accused of an “attempted” coup, albeit tentative, what Congress then did was “a real coup.”

Following events as they developed, Zoila Acosta, a general practioner of medicine in the district of Lima, told Truthout that when Castillo left the presidential palace, he was heading to the Mexican embassy; however, “a special assault force was already waiting for him along the way” where “they stopped the vehicle, and the police diverted the presidential car to the prefecture where it was detained.”

“Now,” says Acosta, a “witch hunt” has already begun as authorities “want to imprison all of Castillo’s collaborators.” She notes that the Mexican ambassador to Peru has been given 72 hours to leave the country while a police squat team has surrounded the Mexican embassy in Lima.

With the exception of Brazil and Chile, Castillo’s removal has been condemned by numerous governments across Latin America, including those of Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, Honduras and Colombia. The day after the Castillo’s removal, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador claimed the former president called him to say he was on his way to the Mexican embassy in Lima to request asylum. Rejecting Castillo’s overthrow, López Obrador harshly critiqued Castillo’s treatment by the “political and economic elites” of Peru. On December 15, in a meeting in Havana, Cuba, of the leftist bloc known as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), 10 member countries — including Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and several smaller Caribbean Island states — condemned Castillo’s overthrow.

The reaction to these developments in Peru has been quite different in Washington, as the Biden administration quickly recognized the new regime in Lima. With the United States’ Ambassador to Peru Lisa Kenna rejecting Castillo’s attempt to close Congress, by December 8, the U.S. State Department declared that: “The United States welcomes President Boluarte and hopes to work with her administration to achieve a more democratic, prosperous, and secure region.”

Asked about the White House’s position, Dominguez told Truthout, “It has been reported that U.S. ambassador to Peru (a ‘former’ CIA agent), Lisa Kenna, not only met Peru’s minister of defense one day before the coup, but on the day when Castillo made the TV appearance to close Congress, etc., she issued an immediate note (on behalf of the U.S.) condemning Castillo’s statement and demanded Peru’s Congress was ‘allowed to fulfil its mandate’ which was to oust President Castillo.”

“Protests continue across the country, and road blockades of key highways and roads in the rural [areas] are still in effect. With the passing of the days, the repression, and the attitude of Dina Boluarte, the media and the Congress, the anger and indignation of the people only grows,” Zoe Alexandra, who is currently in Lima working for Peoples Dispatch, told Truthout. “Key demands include the immediate release and restitution of Pedro Castillo, the resignation of Dina Boluarte, the dissolution of the Congress, the installation of a Constituent Assembly, and justice for the 25+ fatal victims of police repression and the hundred injured and trial for those that have ordered this repression.”

Whether Boluarte’s U.S.-backed administration survives this crisis remains to be seen. In the last six years, Peru has had seven presidents, and polls indicate support for Congress is extremely low among voters. With Congress recently rejecting Boluarte’s request for constitutional reform but allowing for new elections to take place in early 2024, a rapid end to the current crisis appears unlikely.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

CHILE: DISMANTLING THE DICTATORSHIP

Rodrigo Acuña

16 May 2022

ARENA

Australia’s role in the 1973 coup and the return to reform in Santiago

From Australia with love

In his biography The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh writes a passage concerning Australia. In their aim to overthrow the administration of Chile’s President Salvador Allende, by late 1971 the CIA was in Santiago ‘collecting the kind of information that would be essential for a military dictatorship in the days following a coup—lists of civilians to be arrested, those to be provided with protection, and government installations to be occupied immediately’. Hersh notes that since it was aware its activities were being watched by the new administration, the CIA put a formal request to Australian prime minister William McMahon to send Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) agents to Santiago. Commenting on the request, ASIS noted ‘there was no vital Australian political or economic interest in Chile at the time’. However, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, viewed the request favourably and Canberra conceded, sending three agents to the Chilean capital. 

Whether the ASIS agents participated in identifying progressive Chileans to be arrested after the Popular Unity (UP) government was overthrown by General Augusto Pinochet on 11 September 1973 remains unknown, but by October the following year, journalist Ian Frykberg had published an article in The Sydney Morning Herald on the matter. There, citing two ex-intelligence agents, he claimed that ASIS agents were working with the CIA ‘acting as the conduit for money passing from the CIA to newspapers and individuals leaking propaganda information to newspapers and other influential people’. After running this story, the paper’s editor Brian Johns assigned journalist Hamish McDonald to look into it further. Years later, however, McDonald recalled:

I was told by our managing editor, Graham Wilkinson, that the deputy head of ASIS had rang out and said ‘Please, call it off, this is not in the national interest’…I did call the ambassador who had been in Santiago at that time…Deschamps, and asked him if he had any comment on the allegations and his reply was simply ‘What on earth do you expect me to say?’

McDonald’s comments, made in 2015, were to SBS journalist Florencia Melgar, who eventually broke the international story that former Pinochet intelligence agent Adriana Rivas was wanted by Interpol for kidnapping and disappearing seven members of the Chilean Communist Party—and was living in Sydney. Melgar made a formal request to the Australian government to investigate ASIS’s early-1970s activities in Chile, but not only was her request turned down, she was ‘warned’ she ‘risked legal prosecution’ if she published certain material on ASIS obtained through Chile’s Foreign Affairs official records. 

Melgar, like the reporters at The Sydney Morning Herald, is one of several journalists who have attempted to go down the rabbit hole of trying to uncover Canberra’s collaboration with Washington in creating a coup climate to destabilise Allende. In November 1988, when an unfinished manuscript of Brian Toohey and William Pinwill’s book Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service fell into the hands of the Australian government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade ‘took action in the Federal Court which effectively prevented the publication by us of any material about ASIS which had not been vetted by the government’, as the authors commented in a note to their work. Years later, writing on Toohey and Pinwill’s study, Melgar and researcher Pablo Leighton noted that while the book had a ‘reliable record of Robert Hope’s report on Chile’s case, which summarises the findings of the Royal Commission on Security and Intelligence (1974–77)’, the ‘relevant information about the operation in Chile’ was blacked out.  

In mid-2021 an important breakthrough occurred when Clinton Fernandes, former Australian Army intelligence officer and now a professor of politics at the University of New South Wales, sought to have ASIS’s 2017 station reports from Chile declassified. On 2 June 2021, despite ongoing resistance, the Australian government conceded, handing over various heavily redacted ASIS reports that finally confirm Canberra’s role in supporting the overthrow of a democratically elected government in South America in 1973. While this important revelation drew some attention in the Australian media, these ASIS files reveal mainly technical information about ASIS activities in Chile. 

Sub-imperialism versus the rebel state

The geopolitical contrast between Australia and Chile in the early 1970s could not have been greater. According to Fernandes, ‘Australia is a sub-imperial state’ as ‘its geo-strategic tradition from the earliest days is to fit into the global strategy of a Great Power’. Having benefited from Great Britain’s exploitation of India, which saw large sums of British capital invested in Australia, Canberra eventually ‘acquired its own neo-colonies of Papua New Guinea and Nauru and a combined military-economic area of influence that extended to Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu’. With the decline of British power, Australia ‘aligned itself with the United States while retaining its geo-strategic tradition’. While Canberra, in theory, could have declined the CIA’s request to become involved in Chile in the autumn of 1970, such a course of action would hardly have been viewed favourably by the Nixon administration.

Across the Pacific Ocean, Chile had long been a subservient actor within the US sphere of influence. Diplomatically, occasionally Santiago would disagree with Washington. In 1962, at a meeting of the Organisation of American States (OAS) at Punta del Este, Uruguay, the Chilean delegation differed with President John F. Kennedy on imposing sanctions on the new revolutionary government in Havana and abstained from voting to expel Cuba from the OAS. But with four US companies controlling 80 to 90 per cent of Chile’s large-scale mining from the 1920s until the late 1960s, Santiago’s occasional discord with Washington was the exception. By 1970, even after the Christian Democratic president Eduardo Frei Montalva nationalised 51 per cent of Chile’s three largest mines, according to one expert, ‘foreign investors still controlled a quarter of Chilean industry’. 

When Allende took office in November 1970, after winning by a small electoral minority that needed his presidency to be ratified by Chile’s congress, a political earthquake took place at the White House. Two days after Allende’s inauguration, President Richard Nixon summoned his entire National Security Council (NSC). ‘We want to do it right and bring him down’, said Secretary of State William Rogers at the 6 November 1970 NSC meeting. Nixon himself added: ‘Our main concern in Chile is the prospect that he [Allende] can consolidate himself and the picture projected to the world will be his success’. As recorded in notes taken by CIA director Richard Helms at an earlier meeting with Nixon, the president had issued a directive to ‘make the [Chilean] economy scream’, indicating that over US$10 million was available to overthrow Allende.   

Allende’s socialism was via a constitutional path, and was a form of economic nationalism, but it was extremely unwelcome to the United States for precisely that reason. As Nixon stressed in the 6 November meeting, Allende’s reforms posed an ideological challenge. Their success could provide a model for other countries. In the words of the NSC, the United States had to ‘maintain and fortify the special relationship’. Any inability to do so would indicate ‘a failure of our capacity and responsibility as a great power’. If the United States could not maintain its system in the western hemisphere, it could not expect to be able ‘to achieve a successful order elsewhere in the world’.

The direction Allende’s government would take was no secret to analysts at the US State Department. As a senator representing the Socialist Party of Chile, Allende had arrived in Havana only a few days after Fidel Castro and the 26th of July Movement overthrew US-backed Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in January 1959. In Bolivia, in 1967, when Comandante Ernesto ‘Ché’ Guevarra attempted to overthrow another US-backed dictator, Allende’s support went beyond eloquent speeches, obtaining safe passage through Chile for the few surviving guerrillas after the Argentine-Cuban rebel was captured and executed with the aid of US military advisers in October that year. 

When the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) refused to join Allende’s broad leftist coalition because they viewed it as not revolutionary enough, the ‘golden wrist’, as he was known for his outstanding abilities to negotiate, nevertheless supported them with Cuban military and intelligence training so they could integrate themselves into his personal security team. Known as the Group of Personal Friends (GAP), these young men were the ones who stayed and died with Allende defending the presidential palace La Moneda as it was engulfed in flames after the Chilean air force bombed it on 11 September 1973.

According to one Soviet analyst, Allende was not a ‘down to earth person’ but rather ‘idealistically minded, motivated by noble ideas and easily persuaded to do things which were not reasonable, economically or politically, and to take gambles, which he lost. But no one ever actually doubted his honest intentions as a person and his integrity as a politician’. Worse for Washington, since the Chilean Left, with the exception of the Communist Party, did not adhere to any program inspired by Moscow but rather sought to push forward a broadly left agenda for Latin America, the United States could not label Allende a puppet of the Soviet Union.   

Once in office, the UP administration moved Chile towards what the Argentine thinker Carlos Escudé would categorise as a ‘rebel state’, a term that applies when a small Third World country chooses to ‘be part of the anarchical system of the Great Powers by challenging the right of the Great Powers to dominate’. Nationalising the copper industry completely, the UP offered compensation to US companies based on the number of years they had spent and profits they had made in Chile and what they thought was an appropriate figure. According to historians Simon Collier and William F. Sater in A History of Chile, 1808–2002:

From the beginning, the new government strove hard to fulfil its program. It greatly increased social spending, and made a determined effort to redistribute wealth to the lower-paid and the poor. As a consequence of higher wages and new initiatives in health and nutrition, many poorer Chileans, perhaps for the first time in their lives, ate well and clothed themselves somewhat better than before.

Nationalising public utilities, non-foreign banks and a number of basic industries, the UP administration also froze prices on goods and rents while providing credits to small and medium-size businesses. In Allende’s Chile, children received free milk in schools, while hospitals were ordered not to turn away those who could not pay for their own medical attention. In 1972, when a CIA-funded national strike by over 40,000 truck drivers took place, aimed at damaging the UP, the administration relied on a telex network to determine which roads were accessible in order to coordinate the allocation of crucial resources and maintain factory production. Created for Project Cybersyn, a collaboration between the Allende government and a British consulting film, the project endeavoured to provide the administration with real-time information on the country’s production. Decades later Project Cybersyn would be viewed by many as one of the forerunners of the internet. 

In foreign policy, according to Victor Figueroa Clark, the UP was ‘revolutionary in that it proposed a sea change in Chile’s relations with the rest of the world’. ‘Chile’, he notes, ‘would no longer accept a subordinate place within an international system dominated by the United States, and would no longer accept the primacy of foreign interests’. Following this principle, Chile immediately established full diplomatic contacts with Cuba while also creating new relations with countries in Africa and Asia and the socialist bloc, and becoming a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. This was certainly not welcomed by Washington. The Americans sought to undermine the Non-Aligned Movement, contesting political change in the developing world generally by resisting calls for a New Economic International Order and destabilising various countries, encouraging military coups in Brazil (1964), Indonesia (1965), Bolivia (1971), Uruguay (1973), Chile (1973) and Argentina (1976).

Within South America, Santiago continued to support the economic integration agreement known as the Andean Pact, signed by the governments of Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. Resolving a border dispute with Argentina, prior to the 1971 coup in Bolivia, according to historian Jorge Magasich, Allende ‘negotiated reestablishment of diplomatic relations with La Paz, taking a favourable approach to Bolivia’s demand for access to the Pacific. At the same time, Chile granted asylum to thousands of political exiles from the countries of the Latin American dictatorships’. In April 1972 Chile hosted the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Santiago. There Allende warned that UNCTAD needed to be defended as the United States, Japan and the European Economic Community were removing barriers to free trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the forerunner of the World Trade Organization), which ‘at one stroke [would] wipe out the advantages that the system of generalised preferences contributes to the developing countries’.

On 11 September 1973, having strangled the Chilean economy, local elites and the Nixon administration succeeded in persuading enough members of the Chilean military to carry out a violent coup that would see General Augusto Pinochet in power until 1990. As thousands of Chilean leftists and sympathisers who had exercised their democratic right to vote for Allende were imprisoned and tortured in places like the National Stadium, or were executed, their corpses seen floating in the Mapocho River in downtown Santiago, one Australian continued to stay in the country, an ASIS agent, despite the ASIS station in the Chilean capital officially closing in July that year. 

Breaking with Pinochet’s legacy

In December 2021, 35-year-old former law student and activist Gabriel Boric won the Chilean national elections, to the jubilation of the mass of the Chilean public. Not since Allende has Chile seen a leftist president elected, nor such a massive grassroots movement as carried him successfully to La Moneda. The contrast between the two candidates could not have been greater: Boric faced the ultra-right politician José Antonio Kast, who openly campaigned as a student leader in favour of Pinochet during the 1988 plebiscite, and whose brother, Miguel Kast, served as the dictator’s central bank president. Were the Kast name to have needed any further link to fascism than to Pinochet himself, during the election it came to light that the presidential candidate’s father, Michael Kast, had voluntarily become a member of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi party in 1942. 

Through Kast, these symbolic reminders of Chile’s dark past were important, and highlighted what was fundamentally at stake in the 2021 presidential election: a break with the Pinochet dictatorship’s legacy. During the election, Boric repeatedly stated that the judicial processes against human rights violators from the military dictatorship would be sped up, as Pinochet’s victims have complained of constant delays in the courts in carrying out prosecutions and convictions. By the end of the Pinochet dictatorship, in 1990, according to the country’s Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, some 40,018 Chileans had been tortured and 2279 executed, although many have argued that many more cases could be added to these figures. 

In a similar manner, many voices within Chile have been making strong calls for the country’s police force, Carabineros de Chile, to be replaced, given its long record of human rights abuses under the dictatorship, and well into the era of parliamentary democracy. Were there any doubts about its record of brutality, during Chile’s social uprising between October 2019 and March 2020—the largest demonstrations the country has seen since the days of the dictatorship—the right-wing government of Sebastián Piñera used the full force of Chile’s police to suppress dissent, even deploying the military onto the streets after declaring martial law. According to Chile’s National Institute of Human Rights (INDH), by late November 2019, 2391 people had been injured, 964 of them because they had been fired upon with rubber bullets. By that stage INDH had taken 384 cases to the courts, including 273 for torture and cruel treatment, and 66 for sexual violence.  

In March 2021, Amnesty International noted that during the protests there had ‘been more than 8000 victims of state violence and more than 400 cases of eye trauma’. With dozens of protestors dead, over 1.2 million people took to the streets of Santiago in one demonstration alone, protesting social inequality, seeking abolition of the 1980 military constitution, and demanding Piñera’s resignation. The previous year, in an agreement between political parties, one of the key demands of the protestors had been met, with Chileans able to participate in a plebiscite on whether to change their constitution. With those in favour of abandoning the military constitution winning, a Constitutional Convention was created, with 155 representatives elected to draft a new constitution. Although the final document will have to be presented to voters, the political Right performed poorly in the number of its representatives elected to the Convention.

All of these developments shatter the myth that was long promoted by neoliberal establishment outlets like The Economist that Chile was an economic miracle, if built on foundations of state terrorism. While students protesting a hike in fares in Santiago’s metro system triggered the recent social uprising, Chile had witnessed massive student demonstrations and strikes at both secondary and tertiary level from 2006 onwards. Boric himself was a key leader in the protests from 2011 to 2013, known as the ‘Chilean Winter’. Then, university students like Boric and Communist Party leader Camila Vallejo brought the country to a standstill protesting the exorbitant debts students typically incurred on finishing their education.

Fast forward to the uprising of 2019. Boric by then was a progressive member of parliament, and student grievances against the metro fare hike connected with broader discontent about the way vast sectors of Chile’s economy had been privatised under the dictatorship. With an excellent private health system for those who could afford it, approximately ‘10,000 persons died in the first half of 2018 while waiting for an operation or treatment in the public system’, noted US scholar J. Patrice McSherry, adding that ‘Chile’s income inequality gap is more than 65 percent wider than the OECD average, and it has one of the highest ratios between the average income of the wealthiest and poorest 10 percent of the population’. Combine these factors with Chileans’ grievances over the privatisation of water, freeways, the minerals industry, and pension schemes, which see vast numbers of people retire on pittances, it should be no surprise that they voted in a former student leader who, only a few years ago, was himself protesting and facing the Carabineros’ tear gas.

Australia: The chickens come home to roost

As right-wing billionaire President Piñera, surrounded by military officers, declared ‘We are at war’, and unleashed the miliary onto the streets in October 2019, hundreds of people in the Chilean diaspora converged on Sydney Town Hall to protest against the Piñera government’s serious human rights violations. In a similar manner, when they became informed about the Australian government’s sending Australian agents to help destabilise Allende in 1971, over seventy Australian citizens and residents of Chilean origin like myself sent an open letter to Foreign Minister Marise Payne denouncing Canberra’s actions. In November 2021 a second letter was sent to the minister, this time signed by 269 people. Noting that many had themselves been ‘illegally detained and tortured by state security forces of the military junta’, the letter noted:

Our loved ones were subjected to State terrorism from 11 September 1973 through to March 1990, and Australia recognised many of us as political refugees or beneficiaries of its humanitarian programme. We feel deceived as we learn that ASIS agents cooperated with the CIA to carry out the violent coup d’état which brought Pinochet to power, resulting in the violation of our human rights, prior to being offered refuge in Australia.

Arguing they are entitled to an ‘an unreserved apology from the Government of Australia’, because it ‘interfered in a sovereign nation in a clear breach of international law’, signatories to the letter also called for the full declassification of documents relating to ASIS and ASIO activities in Chile. Replying to the original letter, DFAT stated that, as ‘this matter is the subject of ongoing legal proceedings, it would not be appropriate to provide any comment’. By the time Pinochet’s victims sent their second letter, a Sydney court had refused Fernandes’ request to declassify more ASIS files on Chile, on the basis that the Australian Archives Act allows the government to keep certain documents classified ‘to preserve…[its] capabilities to keep secrets as necessary’.

Chilean activists such as radio journalist Pilar Aguilera of the National Campaign for Truth and Justice in Chile-Australia, who had written to DFAT seeking further declassification of documents, also campaigned to have the Pinochet agent Adriana Rivas arrested and extradited to Chile. Although Rivas had been wanted by Interpol ever since fleeing Chile in 2011, and was living in Bondi and working as a nanny, Australian authorities did not arrest her until February 2019. As a result of the campaign by Chilean-Australian activists, in June 2014 shadow attorney-general Mark Dreyfus, QC, presented a petition to parliament signed by over 600 concerned Chilean and Australian citizens regarding the Rivas case. That campaign, with media attention and resubmission of an extradition request by Chilean authorities, contributed to Rivas’ arrest. She is currently detained in Silverwater Women’s Correctional Centre. Having lost her latest appeal in the Federal Court to dismiss her extradition, Rivas’ chances of avoiding having to answer for her crimes in Chile, which include allegedly murdering a heavily pregnant woman, appear to be narrowing.     

In the last months of 2021, when it became clear that the political Left in Chile was making a major comeback in the presidential election, the Chilean diaspora in Australia could be seen mobilising in various Australian cities. When the final tally for the presidential election came in for Chileans in Australia, 2009 votes were for Boric, in contrast with 574 for Kast. 

On the day of the election, Boric’s campaign team loudly complained to the Piñera government that public transport was unavailable throughout the popular sectors of Santiago, where the vote would predominantly be for Boric. Once his victory was official, the Chilean stock market plunged by 10 per cent. While Boric’s light social-democratic policies cannot be compared with Allende’s ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’, the president-elect has promised to dismantle important sections of the neoliberal model.

If Boric follows through on his electoral promises, we can expect a strong reaction from Chilean elites and their US allies. There, the lessons of the UP administration might warrant study once again. In Australia Chilean activists and researchers will continue to press to declassify the archive, which would reveal the extent of Canberra’s intelligence activities in helping to overthrow a democratically elected government at the behest of Washington.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

As Honduras’s New President Seeks End to Narco-State, Will US Stand in Her Way?

By Rodrigo Acuña & Nicholas Ford

TRUTHOUT

22 February 2022

The January inauguration of Xiomara Castro Sarmiento Zelaya from the Liberty and Refoundation Party was a political landmark in Honduras. Castro become the Central American country’s first female president, winning 51.12 percent of the vote, compared to her closest rival Nasry Asfura who garnered 36.93 of votes in November’s election. She has promised to convene a National Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution.

“For us to have the first female president in Honduras means 67 years of struggle (since it was in 1952) that us women fought for the right to be citizens — for the right to vote and the right to be voted for,” Wendy Cruz, member of the international peasant movement La Vía Campesina, told Truthout.

Castro campaigned on an agenda that will strongly empower lower-income Honduran women, who have been one of the hardest-hit sectors in a country ruled through aggressive neoliberal policies for the last 12 years. Castro’s task of governing will be particularly hard given the high levels of corruption and ties to the drug trade that have been linked to Honduras’s former president, Juan Orlando Hernández.

The forces that have been ruling from Tegucigalpa in recent years have not reacted well to losing power. One week before Castro’s inauguration, a fist fight broke out in Honduras National Congress as a faction of rebel lawmakers from Castro’s leftist Liberty and Refoundation Party (also commonly known as the Libre Party) proposed Jorge Cálix as head of Congress in opposition to Castro’s nominee. The problem with Cálix, according to Castro’s supporters, was that he represents the continued power and immunity of President Hernández, who critics have accused of running a narco-state.

There is much evidence to support these allegations. For example, in 2018, Tony Hernández, a former Honduran congressman and former President Hernández’s brother, was arrested in Miami, and last year was sentenced to life in prison in the United States for trafficking “multi-ton loads of cocaine” into the country. In that case, former President Hernández and former President Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa were named as co-conspirators, with the prosecutors accusing Hernández of using the Honduran military and police to transport and guard cocaine shipments.

The alleged criminality of both former presidents extends to other actors in Honduras. In Tony Hernández’s case, one of the most important witness testimonies was that of Alexander Ardón, a former mayor of El Paraíso, Honduras, and the supposed head of the AA Brothers Cartel. Currently in prison in the U.S. for drug trafficking, Ardón admitted to having been involved in the murder of 56 people, as well as torture, money laundering and arms trafficking. He also confessed to trafficking between 30 and 40 tons of cocaine with Tony Hernández from 2010 until the former congressman’s arrest in Miami in November 2018.

Were this evidence not damning enough, Ardón also testified that he was at a meeting with Tony Hernández and Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, the head of the infamous Sinaloa Cartel. According to Ardón, El Chapo gave Tony Hernández $1 million in cash to be given to his brother for his upcoming presidential campaign in 2013, which he won against Xiomara Castro by a narrow margin. In return, Tony promised that the future president of Honduras would protect the Sinaloa Cartel’s drug trafficking routes.

Despite Juan Orlando Hernández’s flagrant connections to the drug trade, his support from U.S. presidents never wavered during his tenure in office. That support finally ended last week, when Honduran officials arrested Hernández after the U.S. issued an extradition request. According to CBS News, “U.S. officials confirmed the extradition request,” however, they did not “give any information on the nature of the accusations against Hernández.”

“Honduran politicians have long known that Washington will grant them immunity from prosecution (with some notable exceptions, including the former president’s corrupt brother). This culture has led to a Honduran [political] class [that hasn’t] cared about the fate of their people,” independent Australian journalist Antony Loewenstein, who has reported on Honduras in his recent book, Pills, Powder and Smoke: Inside the Bloody War on Drugs, told Truthout. “It usually doesn’t matter whether a Democrat or Republican occupies the White House, except perhaps the latter is more honest about his country’s real intentions towards Honduras: bribe [officials] with huge amounts of cash in the hope that they’ll do U.S. bidding.”

Castro’s task of governing will be particularly hard given the high levels of corruption and ties to the drug trade that have been linked to Honduras’s former president, Juan Orlando Hernández.

Noting that Honduras is a key transit point for drug trafficking in Central America, Loewenstein said that the country has “long been a U.S. client state” and that “this only worsened after the 2009 coup.”

During that year, when President Jose Manuel Zelaya, Xiomara Castro’s husband, was ousted by a U.S.-backed coup, most of the world, including the United Nations and the European Union (EU), regarded his overthrow as illegal and unconstitutional. With the EU and most countries in the region withdrawing their ambassadors, the Obama administration stood almost alone in keeping its official representatives in Tegucigalpa. While publicly the White House stood firm that a military takeover had not occurred, according to a leaked WikiLeaks memo, a U.S. embassy cable stated: “[T]here is no doubt that the military, supreme court and national congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup.”

Following the coup, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for Zelaya to be reinstated as president and to finish his presidential term. Instead, Hillary Clinton, U.S. secretary of state at the time, pushed the Honduran dictatorship to call for an election. As she later revealed in the first edition of her autobiography, “we strategized on a plan to restore order in Honduras and ensure that free and fair elections could be held quickly and legitimately, which would render the question of Zelaya moot.” This startling admission from Clinton would later be redacted from the paperback edition of her book.

Zelaya’s biggest crime in office, of course, was that he refused to be a subservient Honduran president to the interest of local big business and the United States. For starters, Zelaya increased the minimum wage by 60 percent and placed stricter regulations on the mining sectors, which included a ban on open-pit mining — moves that were certainly noticed by U.S. corporations. Speaking to the Harvard Political Review, Rodolfo Pastor, the minister of culture under President Zelaya, noted: “American mining companies complained they were not being treated as they wanted.”

Further angering the U.S., Zelaya exercised sovereignty and entered Honduras into the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), an intergovernmental trade and political group founded by late leaders Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro. Zelaya joined the organization in 2008 despite earlier warnings from the north. In an interview with The Grayzone, Zelaya said that John Negroponte, deputy secretary of state under George W. Bush, told him that “if you sign the ALBA, you are going to have problems with the U.S.” Less than a year after joining, Zelaya was overthrown in a coup, and a few months after that, Honduras’s new leaders withdrew the country from the ALBA.

Years later, when questioned on Honduras, Clinton defended the Obama administration’s position in not declaring that a coup had taken place against Zelaya, although she did concede that the new regime “undercut their argument by spiriting him out of the country in his pajamas where they sent, you know, the military to, you know, take him out of his bed and get him out of the country.”

The above history is important to recall because, once Zelaya was unconstitutionally removed from office, it was large sectors of Honduran women who fought against Washington’s men in Tegucigalpa. Writing recently in NACLA, Suyapa Portillo Villeda, an associate professor at Pitzer College who specializes in Honduran politics, noted, “The resistance to the 2009 coup was led by women, who filled the ranks of most social movements. Women have stood on the frontlines to defend ancestral lands and rivers, their rights as educators and healthcare workers, the right to live free of violence, and the right to make choices about their bodies and identities.”

Despite Juan Orlando Hernández’s flagrant connections to the drug trade, his support from U.S. presidents never wavered during his tenure in office. That support finally ended last week, when Honduran officials arrested Hernández after the U.S. issued an extradition request.

Alongside these women, Castro repeatedly joined thousands of Hondurans on the streets calling for her husband’s return. With the movement becoming known as the National Front of Popular Resistance (FNRP), it eventually formed the basis for the Libre Party and helped Castro campaign for the presidency in 2013 and 2017. Winning the presidency after her third attempt last year, Castro during her campaign called for family planning, access to contraception such as the “morning after pill” and promised to decriminalize abortion in cases of rape. According to Portillo Villeda, Castro also committed herself to the “recognition of women’s work, support for domestic violence shelters for survivors, and the creation of centers for the reinsertion of deported women into society.”

Organizers like Wendy Cruz believe the path to ending the narco-state will be very difficult. In her view, the crisis of the national congress was “due to the bribing of 18 congresspersons of the leftist Liberty and Refoundation party creating a crisis of governability in the national congress and one of legitimacy.” Eventually, Castro, who had expelled the rebel deputies from her party, reinstated them as it was agreed that the head of Congress would be Luis Redondo from the Savior Party, whom Castro and her supporters backed. With the crisis resolved by February 8, Cruz said the country’s elites had already begun to destabilize Castro’s government as it “will be in the eye of the hurricane by the country’s most powerful groups” — in summary, those who have ruled Honduras in recent years with U.S. backing will most likely continue to try and destabilize Castro’s government.

Gilberto Ríos Grillo, a national leader of the Castro’s Libre Party, told Truthout that any political and/or economic crisis in Honduras cannot really be separated from Honduras’s historical ties to the United States. In his view, due to the reactionary vision of the previous leaders during the last 12 years, Hondurans have been left with an “almost failed state penetrated by drug trafficking, organized crime and of course backed by the United States.”

Ríos Grillo believes that external bodies like the United Nations could play a role in tackling corruption or drug trafficking and would be supported by President Castro. However, such moves “would affect the interests of the National Party and Liberal Party” (Honduras’s main political parties) because “they have predominantly been linked to the issues of drug trafficking, organized crime and the groups which plundered public works during the 12 years and seven months of a dictatorship which we have managed to overcome during November’s election.” According to Loewenstein, President Castro “offers a possibility of change, but only if she negotiates a real shift in the relationship with her country’s imperial master.”

As Latin American leaders flew into Tegucigalpa for Castro’s inauguration, and her victory was loudly welcomed by the region’s leftist governments in Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris also arrived in Honduras’s capital. While Harris eventually met with Castro and said she was “impressed with the passion with which [Castro] talked about her priority on addressing and combating corruption,” Harris’s comments should be viewed with skepticism given Washington’s close ties to former President Hernández. Only this month, in fact, has the State Department publicly conceded that the Biden administration placed Hernández on a classified list of officials suspected of corruption and undermining democracy.

For now, it appears Castro has survived her first crisis; however, others are likely to surface, given she plans to move forward with her proposal to revoke numerous laws which grant impunity to officials and legislators established during the Hernández administration. Similarly, Castro will have to negotiate with the National Party in order to elect a new Supreme Court chief justice and a new attorney general. At some point, Castro, like Zelaya, may even question how the United States uses its military presence within the country, or with whom Honduras can form trade and political alliances. Given these enormous constraints, every day Castro is in office should be viewed as a triumph for average Hondurans and their fragile democracy.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Doña Lucía Hiriart: First Lady of the Pinochet Dictatorship

By Rodrigo Acuña

North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)

28 January 2022

On December 16, María Lucía Hiriart Rodríguez passed away at Santiago's Military Hospital due to heart failure where she had been a regular visitor for the past few months. Also known as Lucía Hiriart de Pinochet, Lucía was the wife of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, the brutal Washington-backed dictator who ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990. Since Pinochet’s death in 2006, Hiriart had rarely been seen in public.

“At the age of 99 and surrounded by family and loved ones, my beloved grandmother passed away,” wrote her granddaughter Karina Pinochet on Twitter. Many wondered whether the right-wing administration of President Sebastian Piñera would give the former first lady an official state memorial, but Hiriart’s funeral was held in private. Meanwhile thousands of Chileans took to Santiago’s Plaza Italia to celebrate the death of “la vieja” (the old woman), as she was called by her opponents.

While outside the country little attention was given to the passing of the general’s wife, she played an important role in Chilean politics, specifically in influencing her husband to support the September 11, 1973 military coup against the country’s socialist president Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens.

Hiriart was born on December 10, 1923 into a wealthy family in the north of Chile in the city of Antofagasta. Her father, Osvaldo Hiriart Corvalán was a lawyer, a former senator for the Radical Party and the ex-Interior Minister for president Juan Antonio Ríos. Hiriart’s family looked down upon Augusto Pinochet who she married in 1943 and who, as a then Chilean army Infantry School lieutenant, they considered beneath her class.

While Pinochet and Hiriart would eventually have five children together and become the most powerful couple in Chile, Hiriart initially struggled in the marriage. During one period, she suffered from depression due to the hardships of motherhood and the fact her husband’s income did not meet her perceived material needs. According to Chilean journalist Alejandra Matus in her book Doña Lucía: La biografía no autorizada, Hiriart’s home was derelict as it “was always dirty and in the bathtub of the bathroom the unwashed, soaked cloth diapers accumulated, flooding the house with a nauseating smell to which Lucía had become immune.”

When Pinochet was sent on a military mission to Quito, Ecuador in the mid 1950s, Hiriart was further hurt when she discovered that her husband was having an affair with the Ecuadorian pianist Piedad Noé.

Pinochet’s promotion to General Commander of the Santiago Army Garrison in January 1971 changed Hiriart’s fortunes. She had long pushed her husband to rub shoulders with the upper echelons of the military—often breaking military protocol—while being careful to hide his own reactionary stripes. When Hiriart’s husband was again promoted to commander-in-chief of the army on August 23, 1973 by president Allende, most accounts report Pinochet debating whether to join the coup the following month.

According to Pinochet’s own memoir, “One evening, my wife took me to the bedroom where our grandchildren were sleeping.” There, Pinochet said, Hiriart turned to him and stated: “They will be slaves because you haven’t been able to make a decision.” In 2003, according to Matus, Hiriart herself confirmed Pinochet’s anecdote.

By 1974, the coup against the Popular Unity government had succeeded, and fascism was firmly in place. For her duties as first lady and head of the charity Centro de Madres Chile (Center of Chilean Mothers, or CEMA), Hiriart organized an entire floor in the Diego Portales building where Pinochet then ruled. There, according to Matus, Hiriart had a staff of close to one hundred women, mostly volunteers, which included a press secretary, a hair stylist, a makeup artist, and a photographer. She also had a vast wardrobe of dresses, and she was known to wear several each day to different functions.

While Hiriart's public role was one of social functions and charitable acts, she was informed, and likely connected in the dictatorship's dirtier acts. Pinochet and Hiriart were interviewed together by journalist Malú Sierra for the magazine Paula in 1974. Sierra asked the couple light questions like, “What do you think may be the secret to happiness?” Sierra was then kidnapped by the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (Directorate of National Intelligence, DINA) and taken to the torture centre Villa Grimaldi where the journalist claims she was interrogated over the interview. By the end of the military regime in 1990, according to the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (Rettig Report), some 40,018 Chileans had been tortured and 2,279 executed.

Hiriart is also said to have developed a friendship with Manuel Contreras who headed the DINA and would inform her of imagined or real threats. When the wives and relatives of people who were arrested or kidnapped wrote to CEMA asking for any information of their whereabouts, Lucía simply repeated explanations that Contreras provided.

Hiriart also obtained information—either from Contreras or others in the intelligence community—concerning which members of the regime were disloyal to their wives. Since she was unable to curtail Pinochet’s infidelities, other members of the regime were said to have been demoted or dismissed for theirs. Only Contreras was given a pass when he left his wife for his secretary. After the DINA assassinated Allende’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. in 1976, Pinochet dismissed Contreras due to pressure from the United States. Displeased with Contreras’ dismissal, Hiriart left Pinochet for several weeks, the largest crisis in their marriage since his affair in Ecuador.

Throughout the remaining years of the dictatorship, Hiriart continued to head the CEMA, promoting her version of conservative Catholic values. These were in sharp contrast to those of the feminist movements that had surfaced prior to 1973 and have resurfaced even more strongly in recent years. Merging her views on politics and gender, Hiriart argued that a woman’s place was in the home and that mothers had the responsibility to provide a firm hand over their children who should grow up within the order established by the military regime.

In 2005, fifteen years after Hiriart’s husband stepped down from power, over $21 million were found in 125 accounts at Riggs Bank in Washington under a variety of aliases used by her children. That same year she was sued by Chile’s Internal Tax Service for tax evasion over $2.5 million and was arrested with her son Marco Antonio. In 2007, along with all of Pinochet’s children and 17 other people that included two generals, one of Pinochet’s ex-lawyers, and his secretary, Hiriart was arrested in relation to the Riggs case on the charges of embezzlement and use of fake passports. In October of that same year, the court of appeals ruled in favor of the general's widow and 14 other defendants while in November the Supreme Court ratified the sentence.

According to Middlesex University lecturer Francisco Dominguez, an expert on Leftist governments and Right-wing reactions in Latin America, “The Concertacion's shameful cowardice prevented Chileans from prosecuting Pinochet and indict the whole junta, and led them to turn the blind eye on the Pinochet's family, including Lucia's proven and colossal levels of corruption," he wrote in an email.

When Hiriart’s charity terminated its operations in 2019, it handed over 108 properties worth 7.6 billion pesos to the state. By this stage, a disgruntled Lucía only had three full-time staff to attend to her personal needs because the military could no longer justify her previous entourage of sixty staff members.

Commenting on Hiriart’s life in his 2002 book Wives of the Dictators, the Argentine journalist Juan Gasparini considered Hiriart narcissistic, fickle, and relatively uncultured for her position as first lady. In his view, the human rights violations committed by the Pinochet dictatorship were by no means softened with Hiriart’s presence within the regime.

After a church service on September 11, 2012, Hiriart was surrounded by angry protesters that called for her death and had to be escorted by police to safety. Since then, Hiriart rarely left her place of residency.

Recently, on December 20, Leftist candidate Gabriel Boric won the Chilean presidency by a 12 percent margin, after running on the promise of dismantling Pinochet’s neoliberal economic legacy. Just a few days before he won, Boric commented on Hiriart’s death, tweeting, “Lucía Hiriart dies in impunity despite the deep pain and division she caused our country. My respects to the victims of the dictatorship of which she was a part. I do not celebrate impunity or death, we work for justice and a dignified life, without falling into provocations or violence.”

Lucía Hiriart’s survivors include her children Marco Antonio, Inés, Augusto, María Verónica and Jacqueline Marie, along with several grandchildren.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Australia’s Intelligence Organizations Helped Overthrow the Allende Government in 1973

By Rodrigo Acuña

North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)

6 October 2021

On June 2, the Australian government conceded for the first time that the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) supported CIA covert operations in Chile in the early 1970s. These operations created the climate for a coup against the democratically elected socialist president Salvador Allende and his Popular Unity government. The National Security Archive (NSA) recently published some of the ASIS’ station reports in Santiago, and the story has drawn attention in the Australian media.

The subject of ASIS and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) activities in Chile have been the subject of inquiry by journalists, politicians, and researchers for decades. But the Australian government has long worked to cover its paper trail in Chile. Even though the declassification of these documents for the first time is a significant development, few details are revealed by the heavily redacted documents beyond the admission that Australia had an ASIS station in Santiago and collaborated to some degree with the CIA.

Clinton Fernandes, a professor of politics at the University of New South Wales began the process to declassify the ASIS’ station reports in Chile in 2017 with barrister Ian Latham and solicitor Hugh Macken. According to Fernandes, when he started searching for the archives on ASIS records in Chile, the Australian “government's response was that we can't even confirm or deny the existence of records.”

On May 26, Fernandes and his legal team filed a 16-page set of arguments for the declassification of ASIS records on Chile and in early June, Fernandes was finally given files on ASIS activities in Chile.

Decades of Secrecy

Fernandes was not the first to look into ASIS’ activities in Chile in the early 1970s. Journalist Ian Frykberg published an article in October 1974 in the Sydney Morning Herald citing two former intelligence agents who claimed it was likely that the Australian mission in Chile was working with the CIA by “acting as the conduct for money passing from the CIA to newspapers and individuals leaking propaganda information to newspapers and other influential people.”

On December 2, 1974, Clyde Cameron, the Labor and Immigration Minister wrote to the Attorney General Senator Lionel Murphy about ASIO agents in Chile.

“I am particularly disturbed to learn that ASIO agents have been posing as migration officers in South America,” Cameron wrote, “and I am now convinced—though firm denials are to be expected—that the reports of ASIO collaboration with the CIA in bringing about the overthrow of the Allende Government is very close to the mark.”

In 1977, a Royal Commission into Australia’s Intelligence and Security (popularly known as the Hope Royal Commission) was tabled before the Australian Parliament. At the commission, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam stated: “It has been written—and I cannot deny it—that when my Government took office, Australian intelligence personnel were working as proxies of the CIA in destabilising the government of Chile.”

In 1983, Seymour Hersh published a biography on ex-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger entitled The Price of Power. In that book, the New York Times investigative journalist claimed that since the CIA was aware that its agents were under close surveillance by the new Allende administration, Washington turned to its allies— in this case, Australia. By 1971, Hersh argues that the CIA station in Santiago “was collecting the kind of information that would be essential for a military dictatorship in the days following a coup–lists of civilians to be arrested, those to be provided with protection, and government installations to be occupied immediately.” A year later, Australia “agreed to monitor and control three agents on behalf of the CIA and relay their information to Washington.”

Australia’s involvement in the events following the coup continued for decades. In 1989, journalists Brian Toohey and William Pinwill published a book on ASIS entitled Oyster: The Story of The Australian Secret Intelligence Service. Another Labor administration in Canberra took the authors to court to prevent them from publishing any material on ASIS that had not been vetted by the government. Toohey and Pinwill’s final manuscript was negotiated with officials from ASIS and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It reported that, while the November 1970 CIA proposal for ASIS to become involved in Chile was accepted by the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, ASIS itself “noted there was no vital Australian political or economic interests in Chile at that time.”

In recent years, Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) journalist Florencia Melgar broke the international story that notorious Pinochet secret police agent and alleged torturer Adriana Rivas (at the time on the run from Chilean authorities) was living in Sydney. For the story, Melgar said she submitted a formal request to the Australian government to investigate ASIS activities in Chile, but her request was turned down, and she was “warned” that she “risked legal prosecution” if some of the material she obtained  through Chile’s Foreign Affairs official records went to print. 

Thus what Fernandes and his legal team achieved is no small feat. Australia, as an article in the New York Times accurately noted recently, may be the world’s most secretive democracy.

The Contents of the ASIS Station Reports

Although this was the first time reports officially recognized that the Australian government had an ASIS station in Santiago, Chile from 1971 to July 1973, the information published at the NSA is mainly technical. According to the NSA itself, the “documents turned over to Fernandes contain few revelations of actual covert operations, intelligence gathering or liaison relations with the CIA in Chile; those sections of the records are completely censored.”

Most of the communications relate to the difficulties that Australians faced carrying out their tasks in Chile. Reports include comments on everyday events like communication delays, station vehicle deliveries, agent lodgings, and observations like “[a] fluent knowledge of Spanish in SANTIAGO is a necessity.” According to Fernandes, another document notes the difficulty ASIS had in getting a safe while “there are several mentions about how beautiful Chilean women are.”

Despite these seemingly insignificant reports, an April 1973 memorandum states that if Australia’s role in Chile at the request of the CIA became public, Prime Minister Whitlam “would find himself in an extremely difficult political situation as, quite clearly, it would be impossible for him to present the MO9 [ASIS] presence in Santiago as being in the direct Australian national interest.”

The importance of the April 1973 memorandum cannot be understated. Domestically, Whitlam came to power with the support of a large movement against the war in Vietnam. Once in office, his was the most progressive administration Canberra had seen in decades, promoting a wide range of social policies. If Australia’s activities in Chile had been discovered during Whitlam’s term in office, a section of his own Labor base could have become hostile.

By July 1973, the ASIS station was allegedly disbanded, although NSA documents indicate that  “one ASIS agent reportedly stayed in Santiago until after the September 11, 1973, military coup.”

During the time that this final Australian ASIS agent was allegedly in Chile, leftists were being violently tortured and executed by the Chilean military. Peter Kornbluh, Director of Cuba and Chile Documentation Projects at the NSA would not speculate on that agent’s activities.

“That information” said Kornbluh “is contained in still-classified documents that the Australian government should release for the verdict of history.”

Australia and the Pinochet Connection Today

In November, former Pinochet secret police agent Rivas will return to the Federal Court in Sydney to continue fighting her extradition. She is wanted by the judicial system in Chile for the alleged kidnapping and disappearance of seven members of the Chilean Communist Party. Rivas, a former member of the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (Directorate of National Intelligence, DINA) and personal secretary to Manuel Contreras, the head of Chilean intelligence (1973-1977), has already lost two appeals. The eventual conclusion of her case could set a precedent.

According to Chilean-Australian journalist Juan Miranda, there is “real proof that other members of Pinochet’s secret service” could be “living in Australia.” Miranda claims these possible members of the regime are being investigated, and at some point their presence will be raised with authorities in Australia.

Diego Andrés Peñaloza Pinto is a 28-year-old law graduate from the University of West Sydney whose family emigrated to Australia from Chile in order to escape political persecution. Several of his family members were disappeared or killed by the Chilean secret police.

“It is concerning and disappointing to know that the Australian taxpayer was duped into funding Australia's involvement in the toppling of a democratically elected government,” said Peñaloza after ASIS’ activities in Chile were confirmed. 

Peñaloza’s mother, Sandra del Carmen Pinto, added that it saddens her “that the country that gave me so much helped people that took so much from me.”  

Together with 70 Chilean-Australians, Pinto has added her name to an open letter sent to Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) demanding that the Australian government apologise for its participation in the overthrow of the Allende government. The open letter also requests that “the government of Australia declassify all necessary files regarding ASIS activities in Chile in the 1970s.” 

Although his work led to the Australian government admitting ASIS role in the overthrow of Allende, Fernandes has few hopes that he will ever see the full declassification of Canberra’s reports on Chile or countries like East Timor and Cambodia. If those reports were published, Fernandes is sure that they would show Australia’s intelligence agencies' “total immersion in the CIA’s activities.” 

The Australian government signed the new strategic defence alliance AUKUS with the U.K. and United States last month to build a series of nuclear-powered submarines and deepen cyber and artificial intelligence cooperation. In light of a recent series of Australian journalists and whistle blowers being threatened with legal actions or even arrested for their attempts to expose abuses by the Australian government, Fernandes’ comments should come as no surprise. Australia’s secretive nature, and who its key international allies are, has largely remained unchanged since September 11, 1973 when president Allende was violently removed from office in Chile.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

In Colombia, Hundreds of Ex-Rebels Have Been Murdered Despite Peace Agreement

By Rodrigo Acuña

Truthout

2 May 2021

So far this year alone, Colombia has seen 33 massacres of social leaders, trade union organizers and ex-guerrilla fighters belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). At least 119 people have been murdered by paramilitary groups, state security forces or unidentified assassins as of April 27, according to the Instituto de Estudio para el Desarrollo y la Paz, or Institute of Study for Development and Peace. According to Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office, in the first three months of 2021, more than 27,000 Colombians were forcibly displaced due to violence by groups fighting for territorial control and control of the drug trade — an increase of 177 percent compared to last year.

Colombia has a long history of political violence. For over five decades, beginning in the 1960s, it was gripped by a civil war between numerous left-wing rebel movements, right-wing paramilitaries and a corrupt U.S.-backed authoritarian state. This conflict resulted in more than 7 million people internally displaced and over 220,000 people killed. Of those murdered, 10,000 are considered “false positives” — often poor peasants who were murdered by the Colombian military and then dressed up as rebels so soldiers could boost their statistics in the war against leftist insurgents. In 2013, in one of the most comprehensive studies into the conflict, the National Center of Historical Memory noted that between 1980 to 2012, 1,982 massacres occurred in Colombia with 1,166 attributed to the paramilitaries, 343 to the rebels (i.e., multiple armed groups such as the FARC, ELN, M19 and EPL) and 295 to government security forces. In November 2016, after years of delicate negotiations in Norway and Cuba, the FARC and the Colombian State reached a historic peace agreement.

Under the 2016 peace deal, the FARC guerrillas were allowed to create their own political party according to Nick MacWilliam, a trade unions and programs officer at Justice for Colombia in the United Kingdom. As a result, several of their leaders won seats in congress while more than 13,000 rebels surrendered their weapons, commencing a process to integrate themselves into civilian life. MacWilliam notes that, “based in specially created ‘reincorporation zones’ scattered around the country, former guerrilla combatants developed sustainable projects, enrolled on educational courses and undertook vocational training” taking up “diverse new roles in medicine, journalism, tourism, textiles, agriculture and even beer brewing.”

Heading the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia last year, Carlos Ruiz Massieu stated that, “despite continued attacks and stigmatization against them, the vast majority of those who laid down their weapons remain engaged in the reintegration process.”

Still, the number of ongoing murders of ex-FARC combatants is staggering. Mariela Kohon, a senior international officer at the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in the United Kingdom who worked as an advisor to the FARC during the peace agreement, notes that the number of assassinated ex-rebels since the accord was signed has reached 271. “This is a horrifying figure” says Kohon, as “these are 271 ex-combatants who signed up to the peace agreement and laid down their weapons in good faith.” In her view, “it is an absolute tragedy that so many who are working in their communities and contributing to building peace are being brutally assassinated.”

According to Liliany Obando, who is a high-ranking member of the FARC’s new political party Partido Comunes (Party of Communes) in the capital of Bogotá, political violence in Colombia since the signing of the peace accord has in fact increased, and the number of ex-combatants assassinated includes seven women.

The murders of these activists and ex-rebels are acts by “illegal organizations” and “criminal groups” who want to “let civilians know about the high cost of supporting the peace agreement,” according to Camilo Tamayo Gomez, a senior lecturer in criminology and security studies at Birmingham City University in the U.K. Based on his research, these criminal cliques are trying to “exercise control in territories prior occupied by FARC guerrillas” where, for example, poor farmers grow coca leaves that are used in the production of cocaine. Another factor for the high number of murders taking place, according to Tamayo Gomez, is the “criminal incompetence of the actual Colombian government to implement the peace agreement.”

Kohon says the current administration “must implement the peace agreement in a comprehensive way, and particularly the section dealing with security guarantees” of the former rebels that are now part of civilian life. Obando says the incumbent government’s lack of willingness to support the peace accord has left many ex-rebels feeling “disappointed and betrayed and wanting to take up arms again.”

In late 2019, that is precisely what Iván Márquez — the second-highest commander of the FARC — did, issuing a statement on video that he and other FARC members were returning to war given the unacceptably high number of ex-rebels that have been murdered. According to Márquez, the refusal of the current hard right-wing government of President Iván Duque Márquez to abide by the original peace accords was another reason for this action. In his declaration, Márquez was accompanied by 20 armed rebels, including ex-rebel leaders Hernán Darío Velásquez (also known as “El Paisa”), who was once commander of the FARC’s strongest military faction, the Teófilo Forero Column, and Seuxis Pausías Hernández (also known as Jesús Santrich).

The FARC’s frustration with the state’s unwillingness to operate in good faith goes back decades. During the 1980s, the FARC attempted to engage in a peace agreement working with the progressive political party Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union, or UP). While some critics point out that the FARC often tried to manipulate the UP to suit its own objectives, the end result, as documented in Steven Dudley’s book, Walking Ghost: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia, was that by the early 1990s, thousands of UP members had been killed, including two presidential candidates. These murders were carried out by hired assassins and right-wing paramilitaries who often had strong connections to drug cartels, the military and state authorities.

With the UP decimated, the FARC returned to war, and by the end of the 1990s, had between 17,000-19,000 well-armed guerrillas controlling approximately 30 percent of Colombia. Subsequently, Washington sent Bogotá close to $10 billion in aid to fight the FARC under Plan Colombia (2000-2015). By 2008, for the first time ever, the Colombian military was able to kill several members of the FARC’s secretariat and inflict important military defeats on the rebels.

Asked if he saw any parallels between the current era and the wave of killings inflicted on the UP and the FARC members in the 1980s, Tamayo Gomez said no. In his view, today the large number of killings taking place are not for “ideological reasons,” but rather monetary or territorial ones. Other experts take a different perspective.

Adjunct professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh, Dan Kovalik, who has a long history of working on Colombia and defending the rights of trade unionists, states that “the Colombian state is carrying out such murders with greater frequency for one reason: it can.” He adds, “with the FARC demobilized, the state and its paramilitary allies have decided that there is no impediment to wiping out the left and progressive social movements in Colombia. This is the painful truth.” In his view, the wave of violence since 2016 peace agreement is “very reminiscent of the mass murder of UP leaders and members” during the peace talks in the 1980s.

Victor Figueroa Clark, an observer of Colombian politics who taught Latin American history at the London School of Economics, takes a similar perspective, arguing that today there are “clear parallels to the political genocide of the Patriotic Union.” In his view, in contemporary Colombia, “The state, the oligarchy and its allies in the media consider that they won the war. Little in the negotiation process led them to think otherwise. They felt that the FARC were tired of fighting, that they were reeling from the loss of their leader Alfonso Cano (killed after being located through his communications with the government about starting talks), that they were basically losing the war. I think this attitude was shared by the government’s allies in the U.S. and across ‘the West.’”

Figueroa Clark adds that, “as a result” of how the war was going for the Colombian state in the last years before the peace accords were signed, “the government saw peace as a charity offering, a sort of dignified way out for the guerrillas, and not a negotiation enforced by military stalemate.”

Cristian Delgado, a leading human rights defender from the southwest of Colombia and the National Coordinator for Human Rights for the Marcha Patriotica, a conglomeration of student groups, unions, peace activists and grass roots organizations from rural zones experiencing conflict, notes that “since the signing of the [2016] peace agreement, there have been 1,163 homicides against social leaders and human rights defenders in Colombia, 128 of them committed against members of the Patriotic March.” Delgado claims that several of these murders were “committed by agents of the public force, which shows an exponential and sustained increase.”

Created in 2010, the objective of the Marcha Patriotica is to bring national attention to the reality of urban, rural and agricultural Colombia, and express its views on a range of issues such as social and economic rights. According to one observer, in Marcha Patriotica’s view, the end of the armed conflict should be accompanied by real steps toward social justice, including “the need for agrarian reform, a radical change in economic policy, and respect for the right of all Colombians to health, education and work opportunities.” Currently Marcha Patriotica represents over 2,000 national and regional organizations.

Asked for his opinion on the future of the peace process, Figueroa Clark is not optimistic. He says that for peace to succeed, what would be required would be a “fundamental change of attitude from the government, from the state and from the oligarchy that they rule for.” He adds that the United Nations should play a greater role — for example, through an oversight mission reporting to the Security Council. An increase in the protection of social activists and trade union leaders would also be necessary, while Colombia’s armed forces should be seriously reduced and retrained. However, these changes “would require at root a recognition of the state’s role as an instigator of violence.” Figueroa Clark claims the U.S. government’s attitude toward the Colombian government would also need to change, given that the U.S. is Colombia’s “main ally and guarantor.”

From Kohon’s perspective, the “international community should be outraged that signatories to a peace agreement are facing this violence.” In the British parliament, this issue along with other human rights concerns have been raised by Labour MPs, but thus far the response from the international community has been paltry at best.

Back in Bogotá, Defense Minister Diego Molano recently confirmed that the practice of massive aerial fumigation would resume in areas where poor farmers grow coca leaves. In 2015, after a World Health Organization literature review found that the herbicide glyphosate is “probably carcinogenic to humans,” the Santos government suspended the program. While one observer pointed out that aerial fumigation was reminiscent of the days of Plan Colombia, the U.S. State Department for its part declared it a “most welcome development.” In March 2020, during his presidential campaign, Joe Biden stated that he was “the guy who put together Plan Colombia … straighten[ing] that government out for a long while.”

In Colombia, as the daily killings of ex-rebels, social leaders and trade union organizers continue at alarming rates, the Duque administration was met with a massive national strike on April 28 organized by student groups and the Central Unitary of Workers, the country’s largest trade union federation. Demonstrating against the government’s recently proposed sharp increase in taxes that would hurt working-class and middle-class families, and the conditions of a collapsing public health care system due to the COVID-19 pandemic, protesters also expressed concerns about the danger in which the country’s peace process now finds itself.

Posted on January 20, 2026 .

Inventing Reality: Venezuela’s Parliamentary Election

By Rodrigo Acuña

Alborada: Latin America Uncovered

31 January 2021

Last month on 6 December, the multiparty coalition supporting Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro won 69 per cent of ballots cast in elections for the National Assembly. While over 100 parties took part in the contest, the majority of the opposition boycotted the vote – indeed, voter turnout was low, at 31 per cent.

Opposition moderates still accepted the election’s outcome and harshly critiqued those that called for a boycott. Speaking on the opposition network Globovisión, Bernabé Gutiérrez, general secretary for one of Venezuela’s oldest political parties, Acción Democrática, and new member for the National Assembly, said that ‘this opposition, represented in the new parliament, will not continue the ruckus of a parallel National Assembly, although I see and have heard that there are those that will pretend to legislate and direct the country from overseas.’ He added that what was missing from Juan Guaidó’s team was a ‘Minster of Defense’ – a mocking reference to that fact that, despite being recognised by the United States and its allies as the country’s legitimate head of state, Guaidó did not control Venezuela’s armed forces.

The Washington Post described the vote as ‘blatantly rigged’ – as did a similar statement by Mike Pompeo on 7 December. Yet the Post did at least concede that the election might help Maduro, potentially ‘deal[ing] a final blow to the U.S.-backed campaign to force [his] ouster through economic strangulation, a popular uprising or a military coup.’

But the election that took place can hardly be seen in separation from these threats. Indeed, while most opposition parties did publically state that they were not going to participate in the election, those that did had by September come under sanctions from the US Treasury Department. According to Ociel Alí López – a political analyst and professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela – this included five opposition leaders who will now no longer be able to hold ‘accounts or properties in the United States’ and possibly in ‘allied countries’.

The Trump administration’s sanctions against opposition parties that were willing to participate in the election once again highlighted its commitment to overthrowing the administration in Caracas. During his recent Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary of State for the Joe Biden administration, Anthony Blinken, said that he supports Trump’s policy of endorsing Guaidó, whilst describing Maduro as a ‘brutal dictator’. A Biden official earlier this month said that the new president had no intentions to negotiate with Maduro as ‘the Biden administration will stand with the Venezuelan people and their call for a restoration of democracy through free and fair elections.’

US Interference

While the abstention of the majority of the opposition parties received highly favourable coverage in most US media, their violence – and their funding from the United States itself – was conveniently overlooked. In a break from this norm, in July 2019 the Los Angeles Times reported that the Trump administration planned to ‘divert more than $40 million in humanitarian aid from Central America to the U.S.-backed opposition in Venezuela’.

According to Timothy Gill, assistant professor of sociology at the University of Tennessee, during the period of the Chávez (1999-2013) and Maduro (2013-present) governments:

several U.S. government agencies have furnished opposition political parties and opposition-oriented NGOs with training and financial assistance. This has all primarily flowed from USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (and its associated groups, such as the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute).

Gill adds that:

These groups have worked with political parties on projects such as building websites, working with social media, developing political platforms, and reaching out to youth voters. The IRI, for instance, has continually strategised with opposition political parties and has sought to help the opposition unify against the PSUV. In recent years, the Trump administration has allocated more funding for the Venezuelan opposition and the so-called interim government of Juan Guaidó. It appears that the administration is, for example, paying for embassies abroad and for some of Guaidó’s travel. Elliot Abrams mentioned this in a press conference in February. That, I’m sure, is only the tip of the iceberg.

In Gill’s view, from the George W. Bush administration (2001-2009) until the present, the Venezuelan opposition has probably received in excess of $100 million dollars from the United States. The corruption of Guaidó and his team in search of US funds is in fact so deep, that earlier this month even the US media reported on it. But despite such help, things aren’t going well for the opposition.

Speaking to BBC Mundo after the election, two-time presidential candidate Henrique Capriles said that the opposition today had no leader. He added that while he had backed Guaidó in the past, he couldn’t ‘turn a blind eye to mistakes’ including ‘[a]ttempting  to overthrow the government from the Altamira overpass’ – a reference to the failed military coup of 30 April 2019. In fact, unmentioned by the BBC, Capriles himself actively participated in the failed 2002 US-backed coup against Hugo Chávez.

Foreign Observers

While hard-right opposition leaders like Capriles were given considerable favorable international media coverage during the election, no effort was made to balance this even with forces less closely aligned to Washington. Notably, the visit by some 1,500 international electoral observers, the Latin American Council of Electoral Experts (CEELA) and four Latin American ex-presidents together with the ex-Prime Minister of Spain, Rodríguez Zapatero, merited next to no coverage.

Making his third visit to the country, Zapatero declared that: ‘Too many times this electoral system is judged without knowing the process.’ He added that he believed that the ‘electoral process is directed and in motion, for those who are participating. But, those who have not wanted to participate in these parliamentary elections have no moral attitude to question anyone.’

Criticising the European Union’s position towards the South American country, Zapatero stated that he hoped the election would see an end to the ‘terrible sanctions that Venezuela is facing’ as he did not ‘agree with the government of Donald Trump’ and its actions. The ex-president of Ecuador Rafael Correa also made similar statements which, like Rodríguez Zapatero’s comments, went largely unreported.

The same could be said for a politically diverse team from Latin America, the Caribbean, Canada and the United States who went to Venezuela as electoral observers. In their report, they declared that they had ‘observed the Venezuelan people’s sovereignty manifest at the polls in a democratic, free, and peaceful manner.’ Rejecting the opposition’s calls for abstention from the election and ‘the promotion of violence and interference by external factors in Venezuelan life’, they called for dialogue and ‘understanding in Venezuelan society’.

The claims of such visitors are, however, crowded out by those of bodies like Organization of American States (OAS), under the highly questionable leadership of Luis Almagro. This Washington-aligned body attacked the election as a mere fraud. Looking at such claims we might equally remember the OAS’s previous condemnation of the October 2019 presidential election in Bolivia. This was key in facilitating a right-wing coup d’état against Evo Morales, though the accusations were based on specious allegations not founded in reliable data analysis.

At the time, such claims were widely hailed by outlets such as the New York Times as representative of regional opinion. Ultimately, however, such media were forced to backtrack – and finally report the evidence that no fraud had taken place. Given the OAS’s partisan zeal, it is at least unsurprising that Caracas would wish to avoid collaboration with OAS officials. Indeed, given Almagro’s record, Mexico’s government has also called for his resignation.

But what are the effects of the demonisation of Venezuela? Last October, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) published a 53-page report on the impact of US sanctions on Venezuela since 2017 when they were tightened under Trump. While the report is hardly sympathetic towards Caracas, and makes the point that there is an ‘abundance of corruption cases within the Maduro government’, it states that: ‘pressuring the country to run out of revenue with the argument that resources are being diverted by those in power is a radical measure that puts the lives of many Venezuelans at risk.’

Noting that oil revenue has long been used to cover the import of fuel, medicine, food (75 per cent of which is imported) and other basic goods, the report calculates ‘U.S. sanctions have caused the Venezuelan state to lose between $17 billion to $31 billion in revenue’.

According to Alfred-Maurice de Zayas – former secretary of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) – US sanctions have cost the lives of more than 100,000 Venezuelans, in particular due to restrictions on medications entering the country.

Back in Venezuela, through an exchange of emails, Joseph Castellanos and Maury Márquez – a couple in their forties who reside in Caracas with their young daughter – told this writer about the impact of US sanctions. Maury claims that the sanctions have affected her life ‘enormously’ as she no longer has the quality of life she once had. In her view, ‘hyperinflation in the country means you can only cover basic food costs, if that’. While Maury used to work in a state-run publishing house, today she contributes to her family working in the informal economy. Joseph, her partner who still works in the public sector, states:

With separated families, salaries that in most cases do not reach 10 dollars a month, poor public services as a result of the lack of trained personnel and imported materials, a shortage of gasoline due to the same sanctions, and a long et cetera that surrounds the life of Venezuelans, parliamentary elections were held on December 6.

Today, Venezuelan society is scarcely holding together. The fact that massive riots and protests in the country’s working-class areas have not broken out and toppled Maduro is remarkable – a legacy perhaps of the loyalty many may still have for the political project they call the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’. The bare minimum that the mainstream media could do is report accurately on the country’s recent election and the criminal US sanctions aimed at crushing another leftist experiment in Latin America.

Posted on January 19, 2026 .

Pinochet-era Intelligence Agent Faces Extradition from Australia

By Rodrigo Acuña

North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)

10 July 2020

Adriana Rivas arrived in Australia in 1978 from her native Chile and worked as a nanny. She lived a good life in affluent Bondi Beach, Sydney, in public housing provided by the Australian government. Rivas, now 67, was active in soccer and church activities in the Chilean community, one of Australia’s largest Latin American diasporas.

Her comfortable life took a turn in 2013, when Rivas decided to talk to journalist Florencia Melgar of the Australian broadcasters SBS. Melgar was researching the collaboration of two Australian intelligence (ASIO) officers with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The ASIO officers were posted to Chile in 1973, when General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the socialist government of Salvador Allende, with the support of the CIA.

In her interview, Rivas conceded that she had been a member of the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (Directorate of National Intelligence, DINA) from 1973-1977 during the Pinochet dictatorship. Known as “la Chany,” Rivas took an abrasive and arrogant tone as she admitted that in 2007, she had been arrested by Chilean authorities during a routine trip to her home country. In 2011, she fled Chile to avoid prosecution.

In February 2019, Rivas was arrested in Sydney. Later this month, an Australian court will decide whether Rivas will be extradited to Chile. Chileans in Australia say she may not be the only DINA agent who is evading the justice system. Her case will set a precedent for how Australia handles other Chileans who have committed human right violations during the military regime.

In her original interview with SBS in 2013, Rivas defended the use of torture under the brutal U.S.-backed Pinochet regime, saying that, “The same way the Nazis did, it was necessary. It’s the only way to break people.” She said her work only consisted of being a translator and an intelligence analyst. Rivas claimed those were the “best years of my youth.”

But Rivas did not tell her interviewer on camera about her arrest in Chile for the alleged kidnapping and disappearance of seven members of the Chilean Communist Party including a young woman, Reinalda Pereira, who was five months pregnant at the time.

The DINA, according to Chilean journalist Juan Cristóbal Peña in Los malos, was responsible for the “majority of the almost 3,000 dead and 40,000 tortured and political prisoners which the Pinochet dictatorship left.” According to Peña, Rivas studied at the Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia de Maipú (The National Intelligence School of Maipú) and completed an intelligence course at the Tejas Verdes barracks, led by Ingrid Olderock, a specialist who trained dogs to rape prisoners.    

Manuel Contreras, head of the DINA and the second most powerful man during the dictatorship, was Rivas’ commander. According to Rivas, Contreras was “an excellent person, and excellent boss.” When Contreras died in 2015, he was serving a prison sentence exceeding 528 years for kidnapping, forced disappearance, and assassination of Pinochet opponents.

Chilean Community in Australia Calls for Justice

Rivas’ interview with SBS outraged the Chilean community who arrived to Australia in large numbers in the 1970s and 1980s as either political or economic refugees. Her case also raises serious questions about Australia’s domestic and international capacity to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity.

According to Clause XV of the Extradition Treaty signed between Australia and Chile in 1993, both parties are required to act promptly on extradition requests. Rivas fled Chile in 2011 and was wanted by INTERPOL, but Australian authorities did not arrest her until February 2019.

Maria Teresa Mardones, a Melbourne resident and activist within the Chilean community, says, “the Australian government and NSW Police seriously dragged their feet with Rivas’ arrest and the extradition request proceedings.” She says that without the actions of numerous activists in the community, Rivas would never have been detained.

In 2014, the Chilean Supreme Court authorized Rivas’ extradition. But after the Chilean government submitted its request to Australia, the extradition process stalled.

Chilean-Australians and parliament members pressed for action. In June 2014, Shadow Attorney General Mark Dreyfus QC presented a petition in Federal Parliament signed by over 600 concerned Chilean and Australian citizens. The following year, former Greens Senator for South Australia Penny Wright again raised the issue of Rivas’ extradition in Parliament.

In June 2017, Labor MP Julian Hill wrote a letter to Justice Minister Michael Keenan requesting that the case of the ex-DINA agent become a priority as she was a “fugitive from justice.”

Later that year, the Sydney Latin American Film Festival screened a documentary film, Adriana’s Pact, made by Rivas’ niece, Lisette Orozco. In the search to find out the truth about her aunt, Orozco’s documentary suggests that Adriana Rivas was a member of the Lautaro Brigade, a DINA extermination brigade involved in the seven cases identified in the extradition. The film also documents that she was known to be one of their worst torturers, often being reprimanded by her superiors for her excesses during interrogations.

Maria Estela Ortiz lives in Santiago, Chile, and is the daughter of one of Rivas’ alleged victims for which she is wanted by the Chilean courts. Ortiz says her family has been trying to find out what happened to her father since 1976.

“We are aware that Rivas was involved in the murder of my father Fernando Ortiz and a young woman Reinalda Pereira, who was pregnant,” says Ortiz. “The DINA agents were very brave to torture and kill, but they have been total cowards to face the courts.”

Ortiz says she is now an old woman and does not want to leave the burden of seeking justice for her father on her children’s shoulders. Were Rivas to be set free in Australia, before being handed over to Chilean authorities, Ortiz thinks she would flee again. 

Rivas has repeatedly denied the charges against her and has sought bail twice, alleging various medical conditions. She has also appealed the Court’s refusal to grant bail, as she is considered a flight risk, and she remains on remand.

According to Melbourne resident Pilar Aguilera of the National Campaign for Truth and Justice in Chile-Australia, if Rivas is extradited to Chile, she will likely face the same fate as several members of the Lautaro Brigade, who were convicted and faced lengthy prison sentences. In her view, while the Australian government has acted diligently, Chilean authorities have at times “barely moved a finger,” in particular during the transition between the center-left administration of Michelle Bachelet and the hard right-wing government of Sebastián Piñera in late 2017 and early 2018.

“I was surprised when I heard the SBS interview with Adriana Rivas,” says Marta Olea, a representative of the Truth & Justice Campaign in Sydney. “Her name was familiar to me, so shortly after, I went back to a book called ‘The Dance of the Crows’ [La Danza de los Cuervos] and of course, she was mentioned there.”

“Her presence [as an ex-DINA agent] in Australia was not vox populi. Many have said they knew Rivas from years back and didn’t have a good opinion of her…” says Olea. “I was surprised to see the level of support by the community, demanding that she be extradited. Those who knew her also signed, even those who lived in her suburb and even one of her former husbands signed the petition and people who were members of the soccer club in which she had been involved.”

Ongoing Demands for Accountability

In other high profile cases dealing with former members of the Pinochet regime, a Chilean court in 2018 gave prison sentences to nine ex-soldiers for the murder of popular folk singer Victor Jara in 1973. Pedro Pablo Barrientos Núñez, a retired Lieutenant from the Tejas Verdes regiment, and the “material and intellectual author” of Jara’s murder according to Patricio Zamorano, lives in Florida, “where many former oppressors of Latin America hide or show themselves in the light of day, fugitives from justice.” Zamorano adds that Barrientos has successfully resisted an “order for extradition [by Chilean authorities] which for years now has not been enforced by the U.S. justice system.”

Rivas’ final extradition hearing took place on June 16 in Sydney. On July 27, the court will announce its decision whether she will be extradited to Chile. Like other members of the Chilean community, Aguilera is concerned that if Rivas is found to be extraditable, the Attorney General of Australia has the discretion to determine that Rivas is not to be surrendered to Chile.

Aguilera adds that there may be “dozens more DINA agents in Australia who lied on their original migration applications.” The organization she is a part of has “very little resources to locate these agents and verify their identities… …these cases [of possible DINA agents] living in the community need to be seriously investigated by the Australian government.”

Whatever decision the local judicial system or the Attorney-General of Australia takes, the case of Adriana Rivas will set a precedent for other possible torturers of the brutal Pinochet regime who may be hiding in Australia. The impact of the case will reverberate to others who committed human right violations overseas and may now be living in Australia.

Posted on January 19, 2026 .

Trump’s Ex-Security Company and Their Botched Plot to Overthrow the President of Venezuela

By Rodrigo Acuña

American Herald Tribune

12 May 2020

Reports coming out of Venezuela and Miami, Florida in the United States are bordering on the hilarious. If you thought you had seen it all with Venezuela’s hard right-wing opposition and their allies in the U.S. with their actions to overthrow the socialist government of Nicolas Maduro, well, think again. In recent days, images of two captured North American mercenaries have been flooding the air waves in the South American country of Venezuela where Maduro remains the president, despite harsh U.S. economic sanctions.  

According to the testimonies of Luke Denman and Erin Berry to Venezuelan authorities, they were in the oil rich country to get Maduro, either through kidnapping or assassination. Both men are former Green Beret special forces soldiers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan while working for the U.S. private-security company Silvercorp USA. In 2018, this company provided security for president Donald Trump at  some of his rallies. Headed by CEO Jordan Goudreau, aged 43 and also an ex-U.S. special forces soldier, according to one report: “the website for his Florida-based private security firm Silvercorp claims it has planned and led international security teams for the president as well as the secretary of defense.” 

Silvercorp USA apparently first became involved with Venezuelan politics in February 2019 after it worked security at a concert in support of hard-right opposition leader Juan Guaidó organized by British billionaire Richard Branson on the Venezuelan-Colombian border. 

Earlier this month, leading a force of some 62 soldiers of fortune, Silvercorp USA’s mercenary expedition left for Venezuela from neighboring Colombia. By May 4, however, a group that tried to disembark in La Gaira, north of Caracas, were captured by Venezuelan authorities with a second group surrendering in the cacao-commune beach town of Chuao in central Aragua State. 

The details of Silvercorp USA’s enterprise in Venezuela make for comical reading. For a start, after drawing up a $212 million contract in October 2019 with Guaidó to remove president Maduro under the name of ‘Operation Resolution,’ Goudreau recently claimed Guaidó refused to pay a $1.5 million retainer fee hence why he made the contract available to the media. Despite this, Goudreau decided to go ahead with the original mission anyway. He should have done more research on his business partner Guaidó, as well as the actual political reality on the ground in the country his company was going to invade. 

A little known politician within Venezuela, Guaidó, following a rotational protocol at the National Assembly in 2019, became president of that body. But being controlled by the political hard-right, who has long been committed to removing their Chavista opponents from office at any cost, the National Assembly declared Guaidó president of the republic since they did not accept the results of the last presidential elections. While Guaidó’s actions were supported by Washington and over fifty states, the United Nations continued to recognize Nicolas Maduro as the country’s legitimate head of state. 

Back in Venezuela, Guaidó was confident that he could overthrow Maduro and, in April 2019, surrounded by television cameras and a few dozen defecting soldiers, declared that his actions were the start of a coup as he had substantial support within the armed forces. He did not and, although he achieved the release from house arrest of opposition leader Leopoldo López after bribing a few intelligence officers, Guaidó soon abandoned the mutineer soldiers that joined his coup d'état – an event that was primarily staged for the international media from the beginning. 

By May that same year, one report noted that the defected soldiers were on the “brink of homelessness” in the border town of Cúcuta, Colombia. According to a detailed report in the PanAm Post, corruption within Guaidó’s ranks was in fact evident as early as February as:

“Guaidó’s small army created an awful impression in Cucuta: prostitutes, alcohol, and violence. They had many demands that the hotels could not fulfill. Of course, nothing was free. The government of Colombia was paying for some hotels, and UNHCR, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, was paying for others.” 

All this information would have been available to Silvercorp USA. 

By the time the contractors were on their way to Venezuela, intelligence agents of the Maduro government were aware of the mercenary invasion. And if they had not known, Silvercorp USA’s official Twitter account made sure they became informed. On May 4, during the actual covert operation, Silvercorp USA tweeted: “Strikeforce incursion into Venezuela. 60 Venezuelan, 2 American ex Green Beret @realDonaldTrump”. 

In another blunder, Silvercorp USA’s mercenaries were caught with an air gun among their arsenal, which would have provided little help to the 62 mercenaries in fighting Venezuela’s standing army of 340,000 soldiers who are supplied with modern Russian weapons and aircraft. 

While on May 10 more mercenaries were captured in Venezuela, and one of Guaidó’s top advisors has conceded that $50,000 was paid to Silvercorp USA who have now become a laughing stock among U.S. military veterans, there should be few doubts as to the severity of the U.S. economic blockade on Venezuela, or Washington’s commitment to toppling Maduro. 

According to U.S. human rights lawyer Alfred-Maurice de Zayas earlier this year, U.S. sanctions against Venezuela have cost the lives of more than 100,000 civilians, in particular, due to restrictions on medications entering the country. A former secretary of the U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC), in late 2018 Mr. de Zayas submitted a report to the United Nations where he was highly critical of U.S. economic sanctions against Venezuela. Speaking to The Independent last year, Mr. de Zayas stated:

“When I come and I say the emigration is partly attributable to the economic war waged against Venezuela and is partly attributable to the sanctions, people don’t like to hear that. They just want the simple narrative that socialism failed and it failed the Venezuelan people.”

“When I came back [the U.N. and media were] not interested. Because I am not singing the song I’m supposed to sing so I don’t exist … And my report, as I said, was formally presented but there has been no debate on the report. It has been filed away.”

While the Maduro administration has undeniably made its own economic errors, the severe impact of sanctions on the Venezuelan population is precisely what the U.S. and the local opposition have been banking on to turn the military against the government. This strategy is similar to the one used by President Richard Nixon against the leftist Popular Unity administration of Dr. Salvador Allende in Chile in the early 1970s when he ordered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to “make the economy scream.”

Currently, back in Washington, Trump officials have denied any involvement with the actions of Silvercorp USA. 

In August 2018, the Venezuelan opposition also attempted to assassinate president Maduro – this time through the use of drones packed with military explosives. While the Trump administration also denied any involvement with this plot, a CNN report interviewed the organizer of the attack who claimed he met with U.S. officials on three occasions after the assassination attempt in order to obtain future backing. 

In October last year at the United Nations, the Maduro administration gained the support of 105 countries out of 193 in its bid to acquire a position at the organization’s Human Rights Council. Despite this endorsement from the international community, economic sanctions and violent actions aimed at overthrowing the Maduro government should be expected to continue, if not intensify under the Trump administration.

Posted on January 19, 2026 .

Chileans Face State Repression as They Continue to Revolt Against Neoliberalism

By Rodrigo Acuña

Truthout

13 November 2019

Serious state repression has returned to Chile. The military, who were patrolling the streets of the country until recently since October 19, when President Sebastián Piñera declared a state of emergency, have been filmed shooting at unarmed protesters in large crowds or at close range. Additionally, the Carabineros de Chile (Chile’s police force) are raiding the homes of student leaders, detaining them, beating them and holding them for hours or even days without access to lawyers and family.

The organization Swedish Doctors for Human Rights has compiled 80 videos of serious human rights abuses by Chilean security forces since the protests started in October. (Note that the footage contains extreme violence and may be difficult to watch.) According to the Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos (INDH) or National Institute of Human Rights, as of November 4, 4,364 people have been arrested, including 479 children and teenagers. Visiting a rundown government clinic in Santiago, a foreign journalist noted the high number of protesters with “gunshot and head wounds and head fractures.” As a result of Chilean police and military firing indiscriminately into crowds of protesters, over 180 have suffered eye injuries while at least 26 have completely lost their vision in one eye.

In the capital of Santiago, according to the INDH, youths who were detained during the initial days of the state of emergency were taken to the Metro station of Baquedano and were assaulted and tortured by the military. Rodrigo Bustos — head of the INDH — talking to Televisión Nacional de Chile stated: “There are several boys and girls who have been victims of sexual violence, teenagers who have been stripped and forced to squat.”

The current political crisis commenced after Metro de Santiago hiked the price of the subway ticket by 30 pesos (about $1.20) on October 6 — only a few weeks after the government announced a 10 percent increase in electricity bills. As high school students refused to pay the hike, they commenced evading tolls in larger numbers. With the revenue that was to be obtained, the Piñera administration aimed to subsidize private transport in greater Santiago. Along with being one of the most privatized economies in South America, Chile’s is one of the most expensive and, in the wake of the fare hike, vast numbers of citizens were furious and soon supported the students’ actions. By October 18, the evasion of fairs was accompanied with large demonstrations, violence and even the torching of several metro stations. By then, the protests also started to voice grievances against the entire economic system established under the military dictatorship in the 1970s.

Speaking to the press surrounded by military men on October 19, Piñera declared of the protesters: “We are at war against a powerful enemy, who is willing to use violence without any limits.” In a conversation behind closed doors, Cecilia Morel, president Piñera’s wife, commented that “what is coming is very grave” as “it is like a foreign invasion.” Conceding to the opportunities of her class status, she added: “We are going to have to reduce our privileges and share with the rest.” With the richest fifth of households receiving 71 percent of the country’s GDP, and four fifths obtaining the remaining 29 percent, Chile, as recently noted by Francisco Dominguez, senior lecturer at Middlesex University, is a country of vast inequalities. According to Dominguez, “Half of salary earners in Chile take home 350.000 pesos monthly ($481), with 74.3% earning less than 500.000 pesos ($688).”

“I heard about the protests on Instagram,” says 15-year-old Santiago high school student Martina Fuentealba. With the first mass fare evasion taking place on October 14, Martina joined her fellow students on October 15. Asked if the increase in fares directly affected her, Martina said it didn’t because she does not use the Metro much. But the fare hike does affect her grandparents, who are pensioners, she says. For workers earning a minimum wage, the expense of using public transport can vary from 15 to 20 percent of their wages. Martina says she is protesting because she is “tired of all the abuses by the state, the poor pensions and the massive privatizations.” The situation with the Metro was the “drop that overflowed the water in the glass.”

Giulianna Campos Coderch, a 16-year-old Santiago high school student, says she also found out about the protests through social networks. She was protesting “not only because of the 30-peso increase in the subway, but also for 30 years of abuse where [public] enterprises have been privatized….”

According to Alejandro Díaz, a 20-year-old medical student from the University of Chile, the protests should not simply be viewed as an action against the increase of Metro fares or even against President Piñera, but instead as a movement against the entire economic structure with grievances in: “health, transport, the environment.” He observes that the high school students who started evading fares were strategic: They made sure they videotaped their actions and uploaded them to social networks.

Another university student, 19-year-old Antonia Quintero Soto, who is studying agronomy and forest engineering at Pontificia Universidad Católica, recalls that on October 17 she witnessed the first fare evasion at San Joaquín metro station located next to her university. That day, she told Truthout, “I acted only as an observer, since there was only one person breaking the subway turnstiles.” But the next day, on October 18, Quintero Soto claims she joined a march from San Joaquín metro to the Vicente Valdés metro. After that, she has participated in most of the demonstrations, including the protest that took place on October 25, where over 1 million people took to the streets of Santiago in one of the largest marches in Chile’s recent history.

The rage that Fuentealba, Campos Coderch, Díaz and Quintero Soto feel has been channeling itself for years through mostly peaceful protests in post-dictatorship Chile. In 2006, high school students paralyzed the country protesting the poor material conditions of their schools. From 2011 to 2013, in what became known as the “Chilean Winter,” it was university students who brought the country to a standstill over the exorbitant debts they are left with once they finish their education. In both waves of protests, the students faced harsh repression, but the political commitment of many students in both high schools and universities has endured.

Raúl Sohr, a sociologist and commentator for the television channel Chilevisiónobserves that the economic and wage statistics that the Chilean government has given to the public in the past did not note “how that income was distributed, where the vast majority were excluded from it.” Although Chile has long been held up as an economic example for the region, Sohr notes: “That model of economic development, of order, of stability, has been shattered. What has happened these days is the breaking of an image [which was] built on the silence of dissatisfied people.”

The silence that most Chileans lived in was built on state terror, by way of a military takeover supported by the Nixon administration and the CIA on September 11, 1973, against the democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. With Allende surrounded by the military, and the presidential palace La Moneda engulfed in fire after it was bombed by the Chilean Air Force, the president committed suicide while his supporters were soon killed, tortured, disappeared, imprisoned or forced into exile. At least 3,065 people were murdered under Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s rule while there were 40,018 documented cases of torture. In 1980, Pinochet established a new constitution without electoral registers, an open media or an operating parliament.

The objective of the 1980 constitution was to cement the neoliberal economic model into Chile’s political fabric. Although the military allowed itself 10 percent of the export revenue from the National Copper Corporation of Chile (a state-owned enterprise), the areas of health, education, social security, justice, public administration and agriculture were removed from political activity or serious influence under government ministries. As a consequence, any incumbent administration had little power to fund ministries in these areas, or even allow them to seek external loans without presidential approval. This favored the private sector who became highly involved in all those areas of Chile’s economy. With regressive labor laws, it became harder for Chileans to unionize while employers promoted individual contracts over collective bargaining. Meanwhile it also became very difficult for the Chilean State to fund new publicly owned enterprises. By 2019, as a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Chile had the lowest number of state-owned enterprises (only 25) in contrast to Brazil’s 418.

Today, while the military and police enjoy excellent state-funded pensions, most people in Chile cannot expect a comfortable retirement. Many are forced into private superannuation schemes (known as AFPs in Chile) that pay miserable pensions. In 2013, as noted by Dominguez, “1,031,025 pensioners got an average pension of 183.213 pesos (87% of the minimum wage).” This is another legacy of the dictatorship which current protesters reject.

In 2016, in a case that garnered national media attention, 74-year-old former high school teacher Alicia Morales was seen begging in the city of Tierra Amarilla in Copiapó Province in the north of Chile. After 35 years of teaching, her monthly pension of 200,000 pesos (roughly $295) was not enough to cover her medical costs. Speaking on Chilean National Television (TVN), Morales declared: “Light, water and the problem of buying medicine — I don’t have enough for anything; it makes me very sad. So many years of study, so many years of work.” While Morales’s situation is particularly difficult, cases of retired teachers who seriously struggle economically are not unusual.

Edmundo Faustino Zuñiga lives in Graneros, a commune approximately 46 miles from the capital city. At age 71 he is a retired rural primary school teacher living on 300,000 pesos (roughly $400) a month. In 1981, Edmundo says he was persuaded to shift to a private retirement pension scheme because he would have more money once he stopped teaching. He worked for 41 years. Currently obtaining only one-third of his original wage, Edmundo considers his pension to be on the higher end of the spectrum in contrast to other retirees. He states: “They lied to all of us Chileans, it was a lie, a robbery.”

Today, Zuñiga supports the protesters. “They woke up the population,” he told Truthout. “For all the social injustices, here social injustices are terrible, conditions are terrible for working people, they are very cruel.”

Edmundo contrasts the low pensions most Chileans earn with the wages of senators of “10 million pesos (approximately $1,300), 20 million pesos (roughly $2,600), and even higher.” Asked if Piñera’s recent concessions to abolish the increase in Metro fares, create some moderate wage rises and dismiss most of his cabinet were enough, Edmundo replies: “No, things will continue as usual, Piñera has done nothing.”

Given Piñera’s concessions, what’s next for the protesters? Alejandro Díaz expects that the protests in Chile will continue, as will the violence. Recently, Díaz says, he has been supporting Joshua Maureira, an openly gay medical student from Chile’s Catholic University who says he was arrested, assaulted and then raped on October 21 at a police station in the Pedro Aguirre Cerda municipality in Santiago. Maureira’s case notes Díaz is part of a longstanding homophobic culture within the police force. “They raped him simply because he is gay,” Díaz says.

The violence is not abating. On Friday, November 8, over 75,000 people protested in Santiago. Despite 20 people being killed since the crisis began, protesters show no signs of going home. While they originally started protesting against the hike in metro fairs, today, vast numbers of Chileans want to see Piñera resign, see an end to Pinochet’s constitution and bury the neoliberal economic model.

Posted on January 19, 2026 .